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  Schmeckt den der Weltraum, in den wir uns lösen, nach uns? 
     - Rilke, 2nd Elegy, 29-30 
 
 
At the end of the 18th century, Kant’s critical system launched a Copernican revolution in 
philosophy, shifting its perspective from questions regarding what we can know about the 
external world to questions about who we are such that the world appears to us and is 
knowable in this way. This reflexive turn shifted not only the object of knowing, but the 
method by which we determine the validity of our knowledge. From the premise that we 
always mediate our access to objects, Kant drew a distinction between things as they are in 
themselves and objects as they appear to us. By denying knowledge of things in themselves, 
Kant secured a place for valid knowledge of objects in the understanding, deducing those 
conditions that make our knowledge possible. This is Kant’s transcendental method, which 
locates the conditions of valid knowledge in the a priori concepts of our understanding that 
do not arise from experience but are activated in and give shape to our experience.  
While the principles governing understanding make our knowledge possible, 
however, reason demands more, positing transcendent ideas of freedom, god and other 
constructs of meaning that both surpass and unify our worldly knowledge. Reason 
overreaches the bounds of our possible experience, continuing to engage transcendent 
ideas about the cosmos and our place within it as free, rational beings. This overreaching 
leads us to make claims that extend beyond what we can know through the understanding, 
creating antinomies of reason that generate contradictions between two commonly held 
principles.  
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The guiding question of this dissertation – can we conceptualize an overlapping 
space of freedom and determination that allows us to develop as agents within ethical life? 
– begins in the antinomy between determinism (according to the mechanistic laws of 
nature) and freedom. In the First Critique, Kant resolves this antinomy by locating different 
causal structures for nature and freedom such that both can exist harmoniously in a human 
setting that is tied to nature and yet still free from this nature insofar as it is rational. While 
this bifurcation resolves the antinomy, the disunity it introduces into human life continues 
to haunt Kant’s system. If both freedom and determinism are true of our ethical life, we 
are left wondering about the possibility of a unifying framework within which both 
propositions can be made compatible and comprehensible.  
Kant resolves this antinomy by placing each proposition within its proper place in a loosely 
disunified system. The demand for a philosophical system, then, arises in excess of knowledge 
generated by the activity of Reason as it strives for, and fails to grasp, the unity of determinism and 
freedom. The demand for system is not a demand to bring everything into understanding, but 
rather to connect back up to understanding what has been riven from it. For Kant, the demand of 
systematicity is a regulative demand that our experience be coherent; systematicity is a demand of 
reason that guides its approach to objects without engaging these objects directly, epistemically or 
otherwise. Kant does not believe, however, that this speculative turn to systematicity is impotent. 
Systematic thinking moves forward our knowledge of objects and their interconnectivity without 
invalidly asserting knowledge of their actual connection. Kant even goes so far as to assert that 
systematicity raises ordinary knowledge to the level of science.1 Still, this contribution to 
knowledge is curtailed through Kant’s reinforcement of the distinction between constitutive 
principles of the understanding that create possible knowledge and regulative principles of reason 
                                                
1 “Systematic unity is that which first makes ordinary cognition into science” (Kant B860). 
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that guide but do not constitute knowledge. For Kant, systematicity and its accompanying 
organization is a regulative ideal, satisfying the demands of reason without overstepping validity’s 
bounds by claiming that these ideas are constitutive of things or their interrelation.  
This demand for systematic interconnection continues to drive Kant’s philosophy, 
receiving its full treatment in his Critique of Judgment, in which he aims to form a bridge 
between the systems of theoretical and practical knowledge outlined in his first two 
Critiques. The Third Critique again returns to the antinomy of nature and freedom, but this 
time within a different context from the one articulated in the Critique of Pure Reason. 
Specifically, the context of the antinomy in the Third Critique is the apprehension of 
organisms. Biological life in the Third Critique is thus the stage on which the issue of 
systematicity ultimately takes shape for Kant. Through reflective judgment, judgment that 
does not apply a rule to a given object but rather seeks to find a rule out of experience, we 
gain insight into a formative process of knowledge that is neither naturally determined nor 
autonomous of nature. This heautonomous judgment – a judgment legislating neither to 
nature nor freedom, but only to itself – is activated in our experience of biological life, 
where we can recognize an organism as being governed by a lawlike structure and yet as 
not determined by these laws.2 The Third Critique thus opens onto a space that troubles our 
rational self-knowledge by interjecting heautonomy – that which can give a law to itself 
without this law being objectively valid as such, hence that can be experienced as lawful 
without being validly known to be a law – into the bifurcated system of theoretical and 
                                                
2 In the first introduction to the Critique of Judgment, Kant writes that the validity of aesthetic judgments (and later 
extends his presentation to judgments of purposiveness) are autonomous, but not valid objectively. Rather, “It is valid 
merely subjectively, for the judgment based on [aus] feeling, [a feeling] which, if it can claim universal validity, proves 
that it originates on the basis of a priori principles. We should actually call this legislation heautonomy: for judgment 
legislates neither to nature nor to freedom, but solely to itself; and it is not a power to produce concepts of objects, but 
a power only to compare occurring cases with concepts given it from elsewhere, and to state a priori the subjective 
conditions under which this connection is possible” (Ak. 225’). 
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practical knowledge. Kant’s system, I will argue, nonetheless remains divided; while 
reflective judgment offers a new aspect within Kant’s system, it ultimately reaffirms the 
distinctions on which he grounds all possible knowledge, hence maintains the bifurcated 
unity of freedom and determinism.  
We turn to Hegel’s holism in response to these problems generated but 
unresolved in Kant’s system. While Kant’s notion of freedom cannot give an adequate 
account of either our determinations or our autonomy, Hegel views our determination and 
freedom as pieces of a holistic system that give us insight into the compatibility of our 
freedoms and determinations. Carving out a space for a dialectical relation between natural 
determination and agential freedom, Hegel enables us to draw a picture of our epistemic 
life that gives us both insights and tools for thinking about the interactions and mutual 
constitution of our epistemic and social life.  
In the wake of Kant’s three Critiques, Hegel carries forward the project of systematic 
philosophy with an emphasis on unification. Hegel was influenced by both Fichte and Schelling’s 
responses to Kant’s treatment of nature, insofar as both take up the concepts developed in Kant’s 
Third Critique in order to create unified systems that connect mental and natural life. These German 
idealists resolve the antinomy of nature and freedom by subsuming everything within ideation – 
rejecting Kant’s thing in itself and extending the all-encompassing reach of mental activity. Hegel is 
very much a member of this moment in history, but, as I will argue in the dissertation, his idealist 
turn is not incompatible with a modified naturalism, leading to a more dynamic system that gives 
account of our rational and natural life within an overarching and dynamic-developmental 
framework of social and epistemic life.  
While Kant firmly maintains the distinction between nature and our moral freedom, Hegel 
unworks the antinomy between nature and freedom by denying the bifurcated grounds on which it 
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is based. Hegel dissolves Kant’s distinction between natural and rational life in his narrative, tying 
both to what he calls, simply, Life. While Kant tries and fails to resolve the antinomy of freedom by 
positing distinct causal structures for determinism and freedom, Hegel’s holism makes no such 
fundamental distinction to begin with. Hegel locates freedom within determination, thereby 
working through Kant’s antinomy in a way that respects the strife and the unity of natural and 
rational/autonomous life. 
In the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel outlines a developmental trajectory from Life to Spirit, 
preserving nature and rearticulating its appearance on the path to the actualization of rationality in 
the world. In so doing, he also forges a path for theorizing an integration of determinism and self-
determination that allows us to grasp our own freedom within its worldly limitations. By 
demonstrating the continuity of natural and mental life, Hegel denies the grounds of the antinomy 
between nature and freedom. Hegel rejects the premise that the contradiction between reason and 
nature can only be resolved by separating their spheres of influence, articulating a mediating 
position that keeps them in tension within a larger context of compatibility, as demonstrated in the 
freedom that arises from ethical and cultural life.  
Where Hegel clears Kant’s system of its distinctions, history floods in. This introduction of 
history destabilizes the conditions of knowing by locating them in a developmental narrative that 
positions our knowing and normativity within social life.3 Hegel is seeking an anthropological basis 
for our social norms and their critique. The living development of our situated, ethical self is 
articulated in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, where forms of consciousness that move through 
situated manifestations of Life undergo vicissitudes in a developmental progression towards 
Absolute Knowing; throughout, a form of consciousness is simultaneously a form of life. While this 
shift to incorporate life in an idealist framework opens onto a deeper understanding of the role that 
                                                
3 My understanding of Hegel’s social rationality is deeply influenced by Pinkard (1996).   
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social structures and norms play in shaping our thought, it also gives rise again to its own version of 
the antinomy of freedom and determination. From the insight that the very form of our cognition is 
shaped by external conditions, it follows that we are determined by these conditions and hence 
cannot be free to express our own agency by reflectively affirming or denying the norms and 
institutions that govern our society and hence our thought. This dissertation will explore how 
Hegel’s concept of Life and its instantiations provides an angle of insight into Hegel’s dialectic and 
its development in history as encapsulating both the determination and independence contained in 
our epistemic and ethical life.  
From its first instantiation, Life takes on the characteristics of a metaconcept, 
which cannot be directly defined, but can be recognized in its many instantiations. From its 
beginning in self-consciousness, Life continues to haunt Hegel’s text as a concept that both 
conforms to and evades definition. Life manifests in ethical life and forms of consciousness 
as a shifting and pervasive notion. Both its persistence and protean nature make Life a 
suitable focal point for inquiring into the historical structure of the Phenomenology and how 
it gives us a situated account of our possible freedom. Throughout, we will return to Life 
as a metaconcept that accompanies the dialectical turns in the Phenomenology. I refer to Life 
as a metaconcept because it is on the frontier of the natural drives and rational 
instantiations of each historical-conceptual moment in Hegel’s text.  
 
Life in context 
 
Self-consciousness arises out of Life, and its beginning connects us to our natural selves as a 
precondition of our rational selves. Self-conscious life – life made self-aware through an encounter 
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with another living being – entwines our logical and ethical being.4 Hence the concept of Life in 
Hegel serves as the site of the intertwining of natural and rational life by reframing the interrelation 
of subject and object in a developmental story that dialectically relates both natural objects and 
other subjects to an active, historical self. Self-consciousness, as a developmental movement that 
begins in Life, gives us an entry point for understanding our epistemic life, which transmogrifies 
through history in forms of life – organized, dynamic systems of interaction in which normative 
structures are given shape and meaning. 
Hegel’s narrative uncovers and works through several permutations of both natural and 
rational life; the developmental story is not exclusively one of natural or rational development but 
rather of their interaction. It is at the chiasm where philosophical naturalism and idealism share 
common ground that a space of freedom emerges that is both conditioned by and supersedes the 
determinations that form its grounds. 
Hegel’s dialectic and the terms that generate its movement, viz. Life, ideation and 
freedom, reinterpret the terms of Kant’s antinomy. As natural determination, Life stands 
opposed to the idea of freedom as an expression of rationality that is untouched by natural 
determination. The movement and interplay of freedom and determination is spurred by 
ideation, which is both the negating activity of the self and its constructive participation in 
the world. Ideation thus becomes the middle term of the dialectic that allows a resolution 
to Kant’s antinomy. Ideation generates ideas that mediate between the immediacy of 
experience and a rational recognition of how our mental life is already formed by external 
conditions that constitute the conditions of this immediacy. Ideation drives this dialectical 
development in its specific failures to adequately grasp its object. What is contained in Life 
                                                
4 See Michael Thompson’s Life and Action for a detailed discussion of life as a localized concept; it is a ground for action 
and ultimately of robust social practices.  
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splits into the object in its independence and desire (of self-consciousness) for reunification 
in a systematic whole in which both subject and object are brought together, each 
mediating the other. This mediation is the historical development from Life to Absolute 
Spirit, spurred by these fruitful failures of ideation. 
Ideation is not the Hegelian Idea, but rather the process of making ideas that then 
become concepts in the world – concepts that do work and are worked on in turn. As I 
shall explore in more detail throughout this dissertation, ideation becomes attached to 
Hegel’s deployment of the concept of culture (Bildung), which represents the process of 
this externalization and reification of ideas, while holding open space for critical 
engagement with externalized and reified ideas. Concepts are thus material and generative; 
by giving a form to an abstract idea, a concept becomes a sort of thing in the world that 
contains our experiences and informs our actions. This dissertation will follow the 
emergent concept of freedom in Hegel’s Phenomenology as a demonstration of the sort of 
work that ideation does and how this work is essential to the realization of freedom in 
society. Without its conceptualization, the alignment of our concepts, actions and social 
structures of freedom, we cannot truly be free. Hegel’s insight is that conceptualizing 
freedom is a form of action that participates in shaping the conditions of freedom. 
Beginning from the premise that our rationality is social and of a piece with our instinctual 
drives, how then can we frame our ethical life – our agency, freedom and relation to others – in a 
way that retains a place for our freedom and our meaningful participation in ethical life? This 
dissertation aims not only to show how Hegel’s theory of freedom diverges from metaphysical and 
liberal notions of freedom, but also to demonstrate that this theory of freedom more effectively 
describes the conditions and experience of freedom. The claim that there is a place for agency and 
freedom within Hegel’s system does not require the rejections of the interpretation of Hegel’s 
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system as also deterministic and as denying that critique can arise from outside the parameters of 
knowledge set by social mores and institutions. Rather, these requirements of intelligibility create a 
greater ethical imperative for a collective responsibility to shape these institutions, spurred by 
insights driven by contradiction. When we arrive at a contradiction, we will know our work has 
begun.  
 
Notes on the structure 
 
The philosophical problems at play in this dissertation began with my asking if and how Hegel’s idea 
of Absolute Knowing could be redeemed from its apparently totalitarian end. The particular form 
of redemption I focus on centers on the possibility of freedom within Hegel’s system and how this 
freedom is cultivated through critical engagement with the social structures and mores that inform 
our cognitive and ethical life. Tracing central themes in Hegel’s text back to Kant, I have been led 
to an examination of teleology in the Third Critique, out of which the concept of life arises as a 
heuristic tool for approaching this question. Using the concept of life as the lever to open this set of 
questions, this dissertation aims to recreate a developmental trajectory from Kant’s theoretical 
system and the Third Critique to Hegel’s Phenomenology as the seminal text where he develops and 
works through the historical-material conditions of human freedom. 
This dissertation traces the development of the concept of Life that emerges as an Hegelian 
trope that indicates conceptual dynamism and the integrative fabric of development in history. Yet, 
this is not a dissertation about Life. Rather, it examines the narrative of Life as a tool to open up the 
relationship between self-consciousness and freedom through the lens of our formative relations to 
others. I refer to Life as both a trope and a meta-concept – it evades direct definition and is best 
understood through its instantiations. Life is subject to vicissitudes; its meaning, as with its 
instantiation, is historically shaped yet it remains coherent as a concept. Beginning in Life puts us on 
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a developmental trajectory that troubles its own progress. Life begins Hegel’s narrative of the 
development of Spirit in history through forms of consciousness. It is a foundational moment that 
represents both the common beginning of subject and object and the moment of their necessary 
diremption.  
Chapter 1 examines Kant’s treatment of system as that which forms our ability to 
comprehend and classify organic, contingent life as lawlike. This lawlikeness within contingency is 
manifest in the concept of biological life, which bridges the normative and heautonomous elements 
of organisms, thus revealing how our human purpose and pursuits are formed from these two 
aspects of lawlikeness and non-conformity. In locating normativity as a central component of 
judgments regarding organisms, Kant paves the way for introducing sociality into biological life. 
This reading of the normative role of purposiveness in the experience of biological life opens up the 
shift that inaugurates the Hegelian turn and thus sets up the constitutive place of ideation in our 
experience of objects. Yet, this continuity between biology and sociality cannot be derived from 
Kant’s treatment of biological life alone. While the ultimate purpose of natural life points towards 
our cultural lives and even hints at furthering our understanding of our moral selves, Kant firmly 
maintains the division between nature and morality, and thus of freedom, insofar as it is predicated 
on the division of nature and reason.  
The turn to Hegel in the second chapter begins in Hegel’s troubling of Kant’s distinctions 
between our natural and rational selves through the concept of Life. Life launches the reflexive turn 
of Self-Consciousness in the development of Spirit. The development of Spirit out of this 
primordial space of undifferentiated subject and object in Life is both the condition for the 
mediation required for knowledge, but also of the depth of this knowledge in (re)uniting subject 
and object. Yet, the development of Spirit in Hegel is not merely a story of the progressive 
recognition of truth, but one of the creation of this truth through work and social interaction. The 
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integration of Life in recognition renders immanent and social the question of how organisms and 
organic processes are tied to our human development. 
Through explaining Life within Hegel’s text, we are given handles for grasping this insight 
regarding the sociality of rational human development and can begin to see how this sociality is both 
a result of our work and comes to stand against us as collective norms beyond our direct power to 
alter. At the end of the second chapter, we will begin to see how Life takes form in ethical life and 
culture, connecting it more directly to sociality and freedom. As a concept subject to historical 
vicissitudes, Life informs our understanding of the interactivity and continuity of nature and reason, 
and hence determinism and freedom, in Hegel.  
The relationship between culture and freedom powers the development of this 
dissertation, coming to a head in the third chapter where it is taken up explicitly in Hegel’s section 
on Spirit. Through Spirit, the focus of Hegel’s text shifts from rationality to sociality, turning from 
epistemological to ethical concerns. Through this development, the notion of Life morphs into the 
more sophisticated notion of forms of life, bolstered by a progressive Spirit as the achievement of 
this collective consciousness. A form of life is a developed and socially shared framework, to which 
culture (Bildung) is directly related.  
Culture is Spirit’s alienation from itself and thus comes to represent both the 
determination of, and our alienation from, these determinations in a form of life. On the one hand, 
the recognition of cultural life is not sufficient to achieve freedom; on the other hand, Hegel denies 
the possibility of grounding this freedom in anything external to the direct relations of concepts and 
historical conditions constituting a given form of life. Alienation is what allows us to hold both 
within a larger framework and engage in the actions that are both situated within our form of life, 
and not fully determined by them.  
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This work ends by turning to Hegel’s account of Absolute Knowing in The Phenomenology of 
Spirit, returning to the theme of teleology with which we began. Following Catherine Malabou, I 
will raise the question of alternative readings of Hegel, looking beyond his own end in Absolute 
Knowing to a Marxist tradition that holds a more evolutionary than progressive perspective on 
culture, history and freedom. Hegel’s systematic holism gives us a framework for engaging our 
determinations, but ultimately is limited by his own historical/philosophical perspective. While we 
make our history – a central notion in our capacity to achieve freedom – it is perhaps more 
appropriate to say that we make our history, but it is made behind our backs. In taking up Hegel’s 
philosophical lessons regarding our own self-determination within our historical determination, we 
can both look beyond Hegel’s historical context and utilize his tools for peering into our own. To 
engage this work, we must move beyond Hegel, both preserving and overcoming his philosophical 
system as a form of epistemic life that is still relevant for thinking about our own form of 




Throughout the text, I have retained the capitalization of words in Hegel’s text that function as 
technical terms, notably Life and Spirit. When modified, such as in biological life or epistemic life, I 
use the word life in its more everyday sense.  
 
Nature is often used broadly to refer to both animal and human life, with its impulses and needs 
that have causal effect on our interactions and forms of knowing. Nature in this broad sense is used 
as an opposite term to freedom. In Kant, nature is deployed more narrowly in a way that reflects 
Kant’s understanding of its role. In Hegel, this term takes on a broader sense as a basic and 
enduring force in sociality and rationality. The more accurate word to capture this dynamic concept 
13 







KANT AND THE LIFE OF THE MIND 
 
In his Critique of Pure Reason, Immanuel Kant gave birth to critical philosophy by locating the source 
of validity of our knowledge claims not in their correspondence to some object, but in the 
necessary conditions of discursive knowing. He begins his critical project with a deduction of the 
conditions of possible knowing, uncovering space, time and the categories of understanding as the a 
priori conditions of valid knowledge. And yet, Kant himself seeks a more comprehensive scope to 
knowledge claims than that demarcated in understanding. The Critique of Pure Reason addresses the 
drive to create meaning beyond what is derived in understanding, distinguishing between the 
constitutive knowledge of the understanding and those ideas of reason that give meaning to our 
experience and allow for our faith, but do not constitute valid knowledge. In this chapter, I aim to 
show how the conditions and coherence of knowing systematically form the bridge between 
theoretical and practical knowing but also that, given Kant’s articulation of biological life in the 
Critique of Judgment, this bridge fails to cross the gap between experience and knowing.  
In the Introduction to the Critique of Judgment, Kant writes that a critique of pure reason 
that merely outlines the conditions for the possibility of rational cognition through concepts is not 
itself a part of this cognition.5 In other words, though Kant’s theoretical philosophy locates the 
conditions prior to experience that make experience possible, it is unable to give an account of the 
content of experience because this content is necessarily determined by the empirical and hence 
                                                
5 “If philosophy is the system of rational [Vernunft-] cognition through concepts, this [characterization] already sufficies to 
distinguish it from a critique of pure reason [Vernunft]. For though a critique of pure reason contains a philosophical 
inquiry into the possibility of such cognition, it does not belong to a system of philosophy as a part of it, but outlines 
and examines the very idea of such a system in the first place” (Ak. 195’). 
15 
goes beyond the foreclosure of a priori certainty. Our ability to make valid judgments regarding our 
experience – to allow our judgment to inform and be informed by our experiences – is at the heart 
of the problematic of the Critique of Judgment.  
In the Appendix to the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant introduces the principle of systematicity 
as a tool for philosophically engaging with the content of our experience and not merely the a priori 
conditions that make it possible. The objective validity of our experience is derived from the 
presupposition of systematic unity but is immanently justified, Kant claims in the Critique of 
Judgment, through the coherence of our experience in aesthetic and biological judgments. What 
remains to be explored is the validity of Kant’s move from the presupposition to the proof, the 
understanding of which is contingent upon how we interpret the necessity and corresponding 
validity of knowledge derived from experience presented in the Critique of Judgment. Understanding 
can merely assert that there is a principle of systematicity, but cannot know what this principle is 
and cannot make valid claims regarding its application. Judgment fills this gap by making 
experience possible as an empirical system. The faculty of judgment appears at the completion of 
Kant’s system because, in order for our particular experiences to be considered objectively valid, 
they must be systematically unified.6  
Systematicity and purposiveness thus arise as principles that contribute to our immanent, 
empirical knowledge by giving shape and meaning to experiences. Empirical concepts and laws 
                                                
6 “We saw in the Critique of Pure Reason that nature as a whole, as the sum total of all objects of experience, constitutes a 
system in terms of transcendental laws, those that the understanding itself gives a priori (to appearances insofar as, 
connected in one consciousness, they are to constitute experience). That is why experience too, considered objectively, 
i.e., in the way experience as such is possible (ideally), must constitute a system of possible empirical cognitions, and it 
must do so in terms of both universal and particular laws: for the unity of nature [which is implicit in the concept of 
nature as spelled out by those transcendental laws] requires [that instrinsically experience form] such [a system, one] in 
terms of a principle of the thorough connection of everything contained in that sum total of all appearances. To this 
extent, then, experience as such must be regarded, according to transcendental laws of the understanding, as a system 
and not as a mere aggregate” (Ak. 208’-209’). Also see the Critique of Pure Reason, where Kant writes that “For the law 
of reason to seek unity is necessary, since without it we would have no reason, and without that, no coherent use of the 
understanding, and, lacking that, no sufficient mark of empirical truth; thus in regard to the latter we simply have to 
presuppose the systematic unity of nature as objectively valid and necessary” (A651/B679).  
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arise through our experience, generating a demand for a rule that has not been given a priori. Kant 
undertakes the unification of his system at the level of biological life by seeking lawlikeness within 
the contingency of the natural, a lawlikeness he argues we experience in organisms. The unity of 
Kant’s system hinges on our ability to ground normative judgments in both organic and moral life, 
thus connecting the validity carved out for theoretical and practical reason with an otherwise (for 
us) unruly life. By giving an account of our experience of organisms normatively governed but not 
normatively determined, Kant completes his system in a way that both resolves and raises questions 
about the ability of this system to account for our lived experiences and our ability to relate to 
others in ethical life.  
 
1.1 Kant’s architectonic and the special case of systematicity 
 
Kant’s architectonic is built on distinctions that establish the proper activity and domain of 
understanding and reason, enabling him to account for the validity of our claims regarding both 
how things are and how they ought to be. Our ability to make these distinctions and claims hinges 
on our ability to unite and order our different domains of knowledge and experience. Yet, for 
Kant, this ordering occurs in a distinct manner from that of our basic apprehension of objects and 
their simple relations. While the activity of understanding constitutes these objects of our 
apprehension, the activity of reason plays a regulative role in ordering these objects and experiences. 
The distinction between the constitutive and the regulative, which corresponds to Kant’s 
distinction between understanding and reason, lays out the basis of validity of our claims about 
purposiveness and the coherence of our experience.   
At the end of the Critique of Pure Reason, the distinction between understanding and reason 
generates a demand that our experiences ordered by these two modes of knowing hang together in 
a coherent system. The principle of systematicity appears as the necessary condition of scientific 
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knowledge and, more generally, as the principle of coherence of our experience. Kant claims that 
systematicity grounds the unity of the understanding and guides its particular uses;7 it also guides 
inquiry into nature and grounds the identification of species and genera.8 In doing so, “Reason thus 
prepares the field for understanding.”9 Yet, in preparing the field for understanding, reason does 
not ground understanding itself; rather, reason guides understanding in its empirical use. Kant 
further writes that without systematicity there would be no “coherent use of the understanding” or 
“sufficient mark of empirical truth.”10 These statements suggest that subsuming the manifold of 
intuition in understanding requires systematicity to achieve connection among our experiences and 
hence to produce coherent experience. In other words, systematicity makes our experience 
intelligible by locating a single experience in a larger constellation of past experiences. Moreover, 
systematicity arises in response to a question regarding validity in the empirical sciences – i.e. our 
ability to make valid judgments and classifications of natural objects. These problematics of 
coherence in our understanding and validity of empirical concepts encircle a central theme 
regarding our lived experience and our need to validate its meaning for us. 
 The demand for systematicity introduces complexity into the structure of validity 
presented in the Critique of Pure Reason by connecting understanding to experience. Systematicity, 
Kant argues, is necessary to give broader meaning to our knowledge about the world; it is the 
                                                
7 “Systematic unity (as mere idea) is only a projected unity, which one must regard not as given in itself, but only as a 
problem; this unity, however, helps to find a principle for the manifold and particular uses of the understanding, 
thereby guiding it even in those cases that are not given and making it coherently connected” (A647/B675). 
8 “That all manifoldness of individual things does not exclude the identity of species; that the several species must be 
treated only as various determinations of fewer genera, and the latter of still higher families, etc.; that therefore a 
certain systematic unity of all possible empirical concepts must be sought insofar as they can be derived from higher and 
more general ones: this is a scholastic rule of logical principle, without which there could be no use of reason, because 
we can infer from the universal to the particular only on the ground of the universal properties of things under which 
the partciular properties stand” (A651-652/B679 – B680). 
9 A657/B685. Following this claim, Kant enumerates the specific way in which reason and its presuppositions ground 
inquiry into nature and thus guide the understanding: “1. By a principle of sameness of kind in the manifold under 
higher genera, 2. By a principle of the variety of what is same in kind under lower species; and in order to complete the 
systematic unity it adds 3. Still another law of the affinity of all concepts, which offers a continuous transition from 
every species to every other through a graduated increase of varieties” (A657-8/B685-6).  
10 A651/B679 
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connective principle of our various knowledge claims, thus giving coherency to our knowledge of 
experienced objects. Kant devotes the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic to reason’s ability 
to guide the understanding systematically and further the use of understanding. Although he denies 
systematicity constitutive status, throughout he accords it an ‘indispensable necessity.’ We are 
therefore left wondering what the status of this systematic coherence is for Kant and how its special 
place within the architectonic can further knowledge without itself being knowledge.  
Kant states that systematic unity is merely regulative and to be viewed as a problematic 
rather than a real unity.11 As a merely projected rather than actual unity, it remains unclear how 
systematicity can further inquiry through understanding (i.e. push the boundaries of what we can 
legitimately know and experience). This limitation of the role of systematicity for the 
understanding risks rendering systematicity an ineffective and overly general principle that is 
fruitless for furthering our ability to make claims about relations among objects and therefore 
impotent to expand the understanding and guide scientific inquiry. In other words, there doesn’t 
seem to be a principle to distinguish valid from invalid claims of systematicity. Kant too recognizes 
this problem, writing that the principle does not “function merely as a problem for hypothetical 
use, but pretends to [vorgebe] objective reality.”12 In other words, when we inquire into the 
systematic unity of nature, we presuppose or simulate (vorgeben) systematicity as through it were 
objectively valid.13 Yet, in making this claim regarding systematic unity, has Kant not violated the 
proscription on constitutive ideas? If he has not, then how has he not begged the question, thus 
undermining the validity he seeks to establish? 
                                                
11 “The hypothetical use of reason, on the basis of ideas as problematic concepts, is not properly constitutive, that is, 
not such that if one judges in all strictness the truth of the universal rule assumed as a hypothesis thereby follows; for 
how is one to know all possible consequences, which would prove the universality of the assumed principle if they 
followed from it? Rather, this use of reason is only regulative, bringing unity into particular cognitions as far as possible 
and thereby approximating the rule to universality” (A647/B676).  
12 A650/B678 
13 A651/B679, Op. cit. fn. 6 
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This issue of experience’s coherence is central to understanding the peculiar place of 
systematicity in Kant’s system. As Fred Rush writes in ‘Reason and Regulation in Kant,’ the 
possibility of science (systematicity) does not constitute nor is it necessary for cognitive agency.14 
The principle of systematicity may be required for coherent use of the understanding, but not for 
its use tout court.15 Systematicity conditions our experience, separating it from mere sentient 
consciousness, which is sufficient for cognitive agency. Notably, this question of the coherence of 
experience is joined in Kant’s discussion with that of the possibility of grounding empirical science. 
Thus, however we are to understand systematicity, we must keep in mind this connection between 
the coherence of experience and the validation of empirical concepts and laws that could ground 
such a science. Though the distinction between regulative and constitutive principles grounds the 
validity of our claims regarding systematic interconnection and purpose, their distinction is also 
complicated through this introduction of systematicity and purposiveness.  
 At stake in the validity of systematic interconnection is our ability to make causal claims 
that connect our past to our future experience. In “Projecting the Order of Nature,” Philip Kitcher 
locates Kant’s proposed necessity of systematicity in the incompleteness of the Second Analogy. 
The Second Analogy shows that causality must be assumed in the apprehension of empirical facts, 
but it does not give a justification of the general applicability of this causality or address the problem 
of induction through which we can claim that a causal chain in the past will be repeated in the 
future. Thus the doctrine of the Appendix completes the project of the Second Analogy by proving 
that there is objective necessity in causal statements16 and by giving the justification for 
distinguishing between accidental regularities and those that are “endowed with counterfactual-
                                                
14 Rush (2000) 844 
15 Rush (2000) 858 
16 Kitcher 215 
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sustaining force.”17The concepts of the understanding, thought necessary for experience, are 
nonetheless not sufficient to justify our claims regarding the regularity of experience. This 
indeterminacy in concepts of understanding means they are insufficient to provide us with 
knowledge of empirical regularities.  
 In Kant’s Concept of Teleology, J.D. McFarland also notes this insufficiency of concepts of the 
understanding to yield coherent experience. He writes that the causal principle of the Second 
Analogy does not constitute a reason that explains an event, but justifies our assumption that there 
is a reason for it: “The importance of the causal principle lies in the fact that unless it is valid, 
natural science is impossible; but, on the other hand, it does not follow from its validity that natural 
science is possible.”18 For Kant, systematicity is what raises ‘ordinary knowledge’ to the rank of 
science.19 Thus, in order to actually explain events, more is required than the causal principle. 
The legitimacy of this demand for systematic interconnection of our experiences depends 
in large part on our recognition of the limits of reason. Reason stands in immediate relation to the 
understanding alone and has empirical employment only through the understanding.20 
Consequently, reason does not directly contribute to knowledge, but proves nonetheless 
indispensable in orienting the understanding in its pursuit of knowledge. Reason’s sole aim is to 
afford the understanding its greatest application through a “self-subsisting systematic whole.”21 This 
orientation thus allows for the expansion of our empirical cognition by orienting us toward the goal 
of systematicity:  
                                                
17 Kitcher 221 
18 McFarland 9 
19 “By an architectonic I understand the art of systems. Since systematic unity is that which first makes ordinary 
cognition into science, i.e., makes a system out of a mere aggregate of it, architectonic is the doctrine of that which is 
scientific in our cognition in general, and therefore necessarily belongs to the doctrine of method” (A832/B860). 
20 “Reason never relates directly to an object, but solely to the understanding and by means of it to reason’s own 
empirical use, hence it does not create any concepts (of objects) but only orders them and gives them that unity which 




…even if no object can be determined through [the transcendental concepts of reason], 
they can still, in a fundamental and unnoticed way, serve the understanding as a canon for 
its extended and self-consistent use, through which it cognizes no more objects than it 
would cognize through its concepts, yet in this cognition it will be guided better and 
further.22  
 
The understanding alone can give an object to experience, functioning at the ‘backend’ of 
experience to shape experience and objects that are given in it; reason arises as a critical companion 
within experience and propels the understanding to seek new objects. This is reason, not in its 
practical function, but as acting regulatively on our experience and giving that experience a 
particular shape. 
The key to uncovering the importance of the regulative status of systematicity lies in 
examining the point where the distinction seems most tenuous: the marking out of systematicity as 
transcendentally necessary. Transcendental necessity is defined in the introduction to the Critique of 
Pure Reason as “all cognition … that is occupied not so much with objects but rather with our mode 
of cognition of objects insofar as this is to be possible a priori.”23 This a priori relation to objects 
hinges on the conditions that are necessary for their possibility. The paradigm case of this is the 
categories, which form the basic conditions under which our experience of objects is possible. 
However, though Kant begins the Appendix by restating the distinction between regulative and 
constitutive principles, in his treatment of systematicity, which dominates the discussion of the 
Appendix, Kant’s distinction begins to become unclear. His characterization of regulative principles 
begins to use language elsewhere reserved for constitutive principles. Early in his discussion, Kant 
cautions the reader to remember the interest of reason in order to avoid rendering systematicity a 




transcendental principle that is objectively necessary.24 Our orientation to systematicity should be 
the same as with any ideas of reason, which exceed the bounds of possible experience and hence do 
not pertain to the ‘land of the truth.’ However, Kant’s persistent claim that systematicity is 
necessary for the coherence of experience, and hence experience’s intelligibility, troubles our 
ability to place systematicity alongside other regulative ideas of reason, urging us to give it place as 
a condition of experience. 
This limitation of reason as regulative does not render reason impotent in its speculation. 
The pursuit of systematic unity requires that it be in conformity with nature, otherwise “reason 
would proceed directly contrary to its vocation, since it would set as its goal an idea that entirely 
contradicts the arrangement of nature,”25 without allowing that nature is ordered such that we can 
conceptualize the nature of things in their identity. The principle of systematicity provides the 
needed assurance that the world is systematically and rationally ordered, which in turn motivates us 
to discover uniformities and classifications. Yet, Kant makes the seemingly opposing claim that the 
systematic unity of nature is “objectively valid and necessary,” rather than possessing the mere 
subjective validity that he pointed to earlier when calling systematicity a pretense [vorgebe].26 This 
suggests that we can know the order of nature as a real object and not just as a regulative ideal. In 
order for systematicity to function as a logical principle and thus validly, Kant writes, it must first 
be presupposed as a transcendental principle that pertains to the object itself.27 In order to bring 
                                                
24 To do so would violate the proscription against the constitutive use of reason. “But whether the constitution of 
objects or the nature of the understanding that cognizes them as such are in themselves determined to systematic unity, 
and whether one could in a certain measure postulate this a priori without taking into account such an interest of reason, 
and therefore say that all possible cognitions of the understanding (including empirical ones) have the unity of reason, 
and stand under common principles from which they could be derived despite their variety: that would be a 
transcendental principle of reason, which would make systematic unity not merely something subjectively and logically 
necessary, as method, but objectively necessary” (A648/B676). 
25 A651/B679 
26 A651/B679 
27 “In fact it cannot even be seen how there could be a logical principle of rational unity among rules unless a 
transcendental principle is presupposed, through which such a systematic unity, as pertaining to the object itself, is 
assumed a priori as necessary” (A650-651/B678-679). 
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together the antithetical claims of regulation and validity, in what follows, we get a glimpse of a 
new sort of transcendental principle.  
The issue of systematicity’s transcendental necessity is what Kant identifies as the province 
of philosophy. This transcendental necessity of the principle of systematicity occupies a central 
place in Kant’s system for its ability to ascribe lawlikeness to the empirical, allowing for the 
satisfaction of reason in its demand for unifying order while maintaining the prohibition against 
making claims regarding what is not an object of possible experience. Consequently, understanding 
the role this guidance plays in grounding scientific inquiry requires an understanding of the proof to 
which it is susceptible, i.e. its philosophical deduction. Though the principle of systematicity does 
not admit of a transcendental deduction of the sort provided for the categories, Kant speaks of 
systematicity as a transcendental principle that is “necessarily presupposed” because “without it no 
empirical concepts and hence no experience would be possible.”28  
As a transcendental idea, systematicity goes beyond the empirical, but, in order to avoid 
turning over into delusion, it must not be taken as real outside of the empirical (i.e. as absolute). 
Therefore systematicity, insofar as it grounds the formation and validity of empirical concepts, is a 
necessity that is bound up with contingency (as opposed to the a priori, which precedes and makes 
possible empirical contingency). Kant gives this issue its strangest articulation when he writes:  
 
What is strange about these principles, and what alone concerns us, is this: that they seem 
to be transcendental, even though they contain mere ideas to be followed in the empirical 
use of reason, which reason can follow only asymptotically, as it were, i.e., merely by 
approximation, without ever reaching them, yet these principles, as synthetic propositions 
a priori, nevertheless have objective but indeterminate validity, and serve as a rule of 
possible experience, and can even be used with good success, as heuristic principles, in 
actually elaborating it; and yet one cannot bring about a transcendental deduction of them, 
which, as has been proved above, is always impossible in regard to ideas.29 
 




Yet Kant goes on to say that a deduction is possible and necessary;30 the necessity of the principle 
gives rise to the necessity of its deduction. But, as noted, the deduction needed is not a 
transcendental one, but rather one that is connected to the empirical. If it can be shown that, even 
though there is no object corresponding to these ideas, the presupposition of such an object leads to 
systematic unity, extending the ‘cognition of experience’ without going beyond that experience, 
“then it is a necessary maxim of reason to proceed in accordance with such ideas” and the deduction 
of the ideas of speculative reason as speculative principles is proved.31 
Kant thus undertakes a deduction, the key to which is the identification of systematicity as a 
heuristic, rather than ostensive, concept.32 This heuristic allows for our presupposition of 
systematicity under the principle that the object is as if designed, i.e. systematically ordered and 
purposive. The heuristic “shows not how an object is constituted but how, under the guidance of 
that concept, we ought to seek after the constitution and connection of objects of experience in 
general.”33 This characterization clearly avoids the danger of claiming to constitute objects, yet runs 
the risk of being ‘merely methodological’ and thus not satisfying the demand that the 
transcendental principle be necessary.34 Ultimately, it is as a presupposition that systematicity is 
transcendentally necessary. Systematicity is not applied to objects of inquiry after they are given, 
nor is it a hypothesis that could be verified or falsified on the basis of empirical evidence; it is a 
presupposition that guides our research into these objects. In other words: though the 
                                                
30 “One cannot avail oneself of a concept a priori unless one has brought about a transcental deduction of it. The idea of 
reason, of course, do not permit any deduction of the same kind as the categories; but if they are to have the least 
objective validity, even if it is only an indeterminate one, and are not to represent merely empty thought-entities (entia 
rationis ratiocinantis), then a deduction of them must definitely be possible, granted that it must also diverge quite far 
from the deduction one can carry out in the case of the categories” (A669-670/B697-698). 
31 A671/B699 
32 “Then it is said, e.g., that the things in the world must be considered as if they had gotten their existence from a 
highest intelligence. In such a way the idea is only a heuristic and not an ostensive concept” (A671/B699). 
33 A671/B699 
34 Rush (2000) points out that no transcendental principle, whether regulative or constitutive, can be merely heuristic 
or methodological (140). I understand this reading of the ‘merely heuristic’ to indicate a contingent mode of inquiry 
rather than a necessary one, hence failing to satisfy the requirements of a transcendental deduction.  
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transcendental necessity of systematicity is located in its being a necessary condition of coherent 
experience, its deduction does not directly concern its conditions, but looks instead to its 
achievements.  
Following this deduction, we are now better able to understand Kant’s earlier claim that 
the principles of pure reason have ‘objective reality in regard to this object,’ i.e. the unity of the 
understanding, “yet not so as to determine something in it, but only to indicate the procedure in 
accordance with which the empirical and determinate use of the understanding in experience can be 
brought into thoroughgoing agreement with itself” by unifying it to the greatest extent possible.35 
This unification of understanding in its immanent use requires systematicity as a transcendent idea 
of reason. Thus Kant concludes the deduction:  
And this is the transcendental deduction of all the ideas of speculative reason, not as 
constitutive principles for the extension of our cognition to more objects than experience 
can give, but as regulative principles for the systematic unity of the manifold of empirical 
cognition in general, through which this cognition, within its proper boundaries, is 
cultivated and corrected more than could happen without such ideas, through the mere use 
of the principles of the understanding.36 
 
Here we begin to see the regulative role that systematicity plays for Kant in its transcendent use as 
necessary to the development of our cognition as a system. It does not directly give us insight into 
objects or itself further knowledge, but rather motivates the understanding in its inquiry, 
cultivating and correcting our knowledge in its valid use.  
 In these passages, Kant uses language indicative of constitution to refer to the principle of 
systematicity. The limits of the understanding to adequately ground scientific claims leads us back 
to the necessity of systematicity for unifying (and rendering coherent) our experience. The 
satisfactory nature (or truth) of an explanation is not judged by a correspondence between 
representations and independent reality, but is “obtained in the ideal limit of inquiry,” which is 




made comprehensible through the pursuit of certain goals, such as systematicity.37 Thus concepts 
are legitimated when they are employed in the systematization of experience by total science.38 This 
entails that the full criterion for the legitimacy of concepts requires the Dialectic of Pure Reason in 
conjunction with the Analytic or, more simply, the full legitimacy of concepts requires reason. 
Thus muddying the distinction between regulative and constitutive principles, Kant ultimately 
upholds the regulative role of systematicity by affording it a special status, one that he will only 
fully account for in the Critique of Judgment.39  
 
1.2 The Critique of Judgment, or mind the gap 
 
In the Critique of Judgment, Kant reengages the themes that are introduced in his treatment of 
systematicity in the Appendix to the Critique of Pure Reason, furthering his exploration of the 
problematic of grounding scientific knowledge that is based in experience. Kant states the aim of 
the Critique of Judgment is transcendental insofar as judgment is part of the system of cognition: 
judgment fills in the gaps of the system of our cognitive powers, promising its completion.40 Thus, 
though there are only two parts to the system – theoretical and practical – judgment serves as the 
transition that connects these two parts to one another and to a broader account of our experience 
and determinations of meaning therein.  
 The introduction of judgment into the system of cognition rests on judgment’s 
transcendental principle that “proceeds in terms of the idea of a system for dividing nature” – i.e. 
                                                
37 Kitcher 214 
38 Kitcher 215 
39 For a full account of the possible collapse of the distinction between regulative and constitutive principles in the 
Appendix and Third Critique, see Rush (2000). See also Zuckert’s Kant on Beauty and Biology.  
40 Kant here states that the aesthetic and teleological abilities of judgment rest on the same principle, with both 
belonging to reflective rather than determinative powers of judgment. As such, “Critique of taste, in other [contexts], is 
used only to improve or solidify taste itself. But if the treatment of it has a transcendental aim, then this critique fills a 
gap in the system of our cognitive powers, and hence opens up a striking and – I think – most promising prospect [for] 
a complete system of all the mental powers” (Ak. 244’). 
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categorizing nature – “so as to make experience possible as an empirical system.”41 Yet, if 
judgment, as the ability to subsume under given concepts, is governed by the empirical in its 
connection with reason, these judgments will never acquire objective validity, but will remain a 
mere aggregate of experience without the guiding coherence of their systematic interconnection.42 
This set of issues forms the background for the introduction of empirical lawlikeness, or the 
attribution of natural laws within experience without claiming their a priori necessity. Empirical 
lawlikeness pays homage to our experience of nature as being governed by laws (e.g. causality), 
while deferring to the distinction between constitutive and regulative principles and their proper 
spheres. Judgment straddles these two realms with one foot firmly grounded in experience and the 
other in systematic interconnection and (lawlike) rules that give these experiences meaning and 
furthers our knowledge in general by placing these experiences within a broader context and 
applicability.  
 The Critique of Judgment aims to elucidate: 1) the difference between the causality of 
technic or art and mechanism, 2) the ability to give an account of the type of necessity that governs 
organisms, and 3) the ability to ascertain and establish empirical laws.  It is through judgment that 
we begin to see the deep connection between the regulative idea of systematicity as it appears in the 
Appendix to the Dialectic of the Critique of Pure Reason and the principle of purposiveness that 
dominates the discussion in the Critique of Judgment. In the Critique of Judgment, this discussion is 
oriented by the distinction between determinate and reflective judgment. While determinate 
                                                
41 Ak. 243’ 
42 This thought, articulated from different angles, appears in many forms throughout the Appendix to the Critique of Pure 
Reason and the First Introduction to the Critique of Judgment. It receives one of its clearest articulations at Ak. 212’, 
where Kant writes: “The principle by which we reflect on given objects of nature is this: that for all natural things 
concepts can be found that are determined empirically. This means that we can always presuppose nature’s products to 
have a form that is possible in terms of universal laws which we can cognize. For if we were not allowed to pressupose 
this, and did not base our treatment of empirical presentations on this principle, then all our reflection would be 
performed merely haphazardly and blindly, and hence without our having a basis for expecting that this [reflection] is in 
agreement with nature.” 
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judgment consists in the application of a given concept to an object by subsuming a particular under 
a given universal, reflective judgment must find the universal for a given particular when no such 
concept is already given. In order to validly arrive at this concept from the empirical, reflective 
judgment requires a principle for its employment.  
As such, experience could never offer this principle, “because only by presupposing this 
principle can we engage in experiences in a systematic way.”43 Thus the systematicity that 
completes the system of philosophy, in order to achieve the transcendental status Kant accords it, 
must be given by judgment itself:  
So if there is to be a concept or rule that rises originally from the power of judgment, it 
would have to be a concept of things of nature insofar as nature conforms to our power of 
judgment, and hence a concept of a [special] character of nature: the only concept we could 
form of this character is that [nature’s] arrangement conforms to the ability we have to 
subsume the particular laws, which are given, under more universal laws, even though 
these are not given. In other words, the concept would have to be that of a purposiveness 
of nature for the sake of our ability to cognize nature, insofar as this ability requires that we 
be able to judge the particular as contained under the universal and to subsume it under the 
concept of a nature.44  
 
This concept is “the concept of experience as a system in terms of empirical laws.”45 While determinate 
judgment proceeds schematically according to the laws of another power, reflective judgment 
attaches to and is connected with “nothing but the reflection and its form.”46 Reflective judgment is 
catalyzed by experience and governed by its own internal laws; it opens onto a novel engagement 
with our own experience, one that admits of our furthering knowledge within experience. When 
judgment determines, it merely subsumes and hence is not autonomous; when judgment reflects, it 
must find the law where there is no objective law. Since there is no principle, reflective judgment 
must use itself as a principle that is merely subjective and that governs the purposive use of our 
                                                
43 Ak. 211’ 
44 Ak. 202’-203’ 
45 Ak. 203’ 
46 Ak. 249’ 
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cognitive powers. The question looming over our reading of teleological judgment in particular is 
of the nature of these empirical laws and the source of their validity.  
Reflective judgment alters both the overall Kantian architectonic and the role that 
experience plays therein by allowing for the generation of knowledge and the attribution of 
meaning to particularity, which can only be achieved in experience. Through experience, new 
concepts are forged and our knowledge is furthered. As such, reflective judgment both fits within 
and disrupts the architectonic through the introduction of empirical (or contingent) laws. Kant 
gives us our first clue as to the form of validity particular to judgment when he categorizes 
reflective judgment as providing its own a priori principles,47 which allows us to think about 
purposiveness in nature as not only possible but also necessary.48 This necessity refers to both the 
ability of purposiveness to satisfy reason in its demand for unity and to the motivating condition of 
scientific inquiry. Kant suggests that our inquiry into nature requires that we think of nature as 
being created by a most perfect being and as itself a systematic and purposive unity. Kant gives us 
another clue when he writes that, for a thing to be an end, its parts must be possible only in relation 
to the whole.49 This sense of possibility is subjective (though nonetheless universal) rather than 
objective: the idea of the whole is what Kant calls a ‘cognitive ground’ [Erkenntnisgrund]. The 
heuristic of judgment thus furthers our inquiry, extending the validity of our knowledge into 
experience. 
Reflective judgment uses maxims that allow us to cognize natural laws in experience; it 
states within itself its own conditions under which it must be enunciated. Reflective judgment thus 
                                                
47 “It is not determinative judgment, but merely reflective judgment, that has a priori principles of its own” (Ak. 248’). 
48 “Judgment first makes it possible, indeed necessary, for us to think of nature as having not only a mechanical 
necessity but also a purposiveness; if we did not presuppose this purposiveness, there could not be systematic unity in 
the thorough classification of particular forms in terms of empirical laws” (Ak. 219’). 
49 In §65, ‘Things [Considered] as Natural Purposes Are Organized Beings,’ Kant writes: “In order for a thing to be a 
natural purpose… the possibility of its parts (as concerns both their existence and their form) must depend on their 
relation to the whole. For since the thing itself is a purpose, it is covered [befaßt] by a concept or idea that must 
determine a priori everything that the thing is to contain” (Ak. 373).  
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possesses a sort of autonomy because it is able to find the rule rather than having the rule 
determined for it, as it is in determinate judgment. Still, though the legislation of judgment is 
autonomous, it is not valid objectively (as it is in theoretical laws of nature or practical laws of 
freedom). Hence Kant names it ‘heautonomy’ because it legislates neither to nature nor freedom 
but only to itself.50 
In the Critique of Judgment, judgment becomes central to the formation of empirical laws, 
i.e. to a lawfulness that is objectively contingent but subjectively necessary. And yet, if the 
empirical law is to be at all lawlike, this objective contingency must not preclude objective validity. A 
critique of reflective judgment forms the connection between objective contingency and subjective 
necessity. This function of judgment is nowhere more evident than in claims to purposiveness, 
through which a merely reflective judgment “acquires a claim to universal validity and necessity.”51  
 Given Kant’s treatment of law in the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of Practical 
Reason, the concept of a law that is based in contingency seems very strange indeed. This again 
brings to the fore the problem of the distinction between regulative and constitutive principles. 
Purposiveness is part of an organism’s possibility qua living, ordered thing, but not of its possibility 
tout court. Thus the contradiction between objective necessity and lawlike organic contingency is 
resolved when order is viewed regulatively. Huneman writes: “The difference between system (= 
necessary order) and technique (= contingent order) has been replaced by the difference between 
nature (lawlike) and order of nature (constituted by the transcendental presuppositions of reason)… 
the order of nature is necessitated by a kind of necessity other than that of nature itself with its 
laws.”52  
                                                
50 Ak. 225’ Op. cit. fn. 2 
51 Ak. 243’ 
52 Huneman (2007) 78 
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 As self-grounding, judgment can validly presuppose the systematicity of nature, but this 
does not – indeed must not – entail that it can therefore locate systematicity and purposiveness in 
nature itself: “Judgment presupposes it only in relation to this power itself, even though this 
purposiveness does also carry with it the concept of a possible objective purposiveness, i.e., of a 
lawfulness of things of nature as natural purposes.”53 And yet its regulative constriction nonetheless 
allows for a lawlikeness, even in the absence of possible empirical verification of the presupposition 
itself. This is possible because Kant is concerned with our experience of lawlikeness – an 
experience that takes place in excess of nature insofar as this lawlikeness attributes regularity and 
purpose to natural objects. This experience leads to the antinomy of reflective judgment. The 
antinomy of judgment arises when we demand both a mechanistic and teleological causal 
explanation for organisms. Our understanding of organisms as organized beings with purposive 
functioning entails that we regard organisms as both purposes (as caused by a concept) and as 
products of nature (as produced by a process that does not involve a concept, i.e. 
mechanistically).54 By distinguishing between those determinative judgments regarding mechanistic 
causation in organisms and the reflective judgments of teleology, Kant is able to mark out a place 
for the order of nature without undermining its causal determination.  
 If reflective judgment provides the conditions for empirical laws, then the key to resolving 
the antinomy of judgment is to distinguish between empirical laws, theoretical laws, and norms. In 
describing the antinomy of judgment, Kant writes that to treat the maxims of purposiveness 
constitutively is to treat them as determinate judgments. This would result, not in an antinomy of 
judgment, but in a conflict within the legislation of reason. Keeping the tension in play while 
                                                
53 Ak. 248’ 
54 Kant gives a full treatment of this topic in §64 ‘On the Character Peculiar to Things [Considered] as Natural 
Purposes,’ which he begins: “To say that a thing is possible only as a purpose is to say that the causality that gave rise to 
it must be sought, not in the mechanism of nature, but in a cause whose ability to act is determined by concepts” (Ak. 
369).   
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resolving the conflict between our judgment regarding organisms and determinate judgments, Kant 
does not here deny the possibility of empirical law demonstrating all the regularity of law. He does 
deny that an empirical law is of the same type as that of determinate judgment, in which the 
necessity of subsumption under concepts cannot be other than it is. What, then, is the necessity of 
empirical law such that it is clearly distinguished from the legislation of reason? Considered as part 
of reflective judgment, there is no conflict between the two maxims because reflective judgment 
makes a claim about how I ought to judge rather than about the possibility of the thing itself. While 
this distinction assuages the conflict, our persistent experience of the normative rule keeps alive the 
tension between these laws as true of an organism or true merely of our apprehension of organisms.  
 Kant’s resolution of the antinomy asserts that purposiveness does not stand opposed to 
mechanism (as does freedom in the Third Antinomy of Reason), but that it is meant to explain 
something within our experience of organisms in particular. This also helps account for Kant’s 
comment in the First Introduction, where he writes that we should pursue mechanical explanation 
as far as possible because this is the basis of true physical explanation of nature.55 The type of 
explanation given in mechanical explanation qualitatively differs from that of purposive explanation 
without conflicting with it. In “Kant on Understanding Organisms as Natural Purposes,” Hannah 
Ginsborg points out that the mechanical inexplicability of organisms is not merely a matter of their 
origin.56 Presumably, there are other things in nature that mechanistic explanation cannot fully 
account for, such as geographic formations, yet we do not require purposive explanations of the 
inorganic in the same way we seek an explanation regarding the unity of purposive functioning in an 
organism. Thus the sort of explanation we seek differs in the case of organisms: organisms do not 
                                                
55 “In our empirical investigation of nature in its causal connection, we can and should endeavor to [proceed] in terms of 
nature’s merely mechanical laws as far as we can, for in these laws lie the true physical bases for [an] explanation [of 
nature, the bases] which [in their] coherence constitute what scientific knowledge of nature we have through reason” 
(Ak. 235’).  
56 Ginsborg (2001) 243 
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merely require an explanation of how they came to be, but of how they possess coherence and 
consistency of behavior.57 
 Put differently, the concept of the whole does not cause the unity of the organism, but is 
nonetheless responsible for our ability to grasp the organism as unified and in a unified way. It is not 
a hypothesis about the cause of an organism, but about the grounds for cognizing it, guiding our 
research, not only into causes, but also into the structure and working of an organism.58 In 
organisms, then, this relation between the idea of the whole and the combination of its parts 
determines the object, not as cause, “but as the basis on which someone judging this whole cognizes 
the systematic unity in the form and combination of all the manifold contained in the given 
matter.”59 This claim that the unity of the organism determines its parts is located within judgment 
itself, both in its source and its validity: nature’s purposiveness, “whether it is merely formal or real, 
is only a relation of things to our power of judgment.”60 Hence purposiveness is merely regulative 
because it does not posit anything about the object, but only about our relation to the object: “We 
say that we put final causes into things, rather than, as it were, lifting them out of our perception of 
things.”61 
 The key to understanding the validity of a reflective judgment thus lies in its being a 
subjective rather than an objective judgment. Considered with regard to taste, this judgment does 
not determine something in the object, but in us. The free (rather than determinate) relation 
between the understanding and imagination that marks aesthetic judgment gives it, however, both 
its subjective character and its universality. Kant writes: “So it is actually only in taste, and in taste 
concerning objects of nature [rather than art], that judgment reveals itself as a power that has its 
                                                
57 Ginsborg (2001) 245 
58 Ginsborg (2001) 235 
59 Ak. 373 
60 Ak. 221’ 
61 Ak. 220’, fn. 27 
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own principle and hence is justified – which in the case of this power might come as a surprise – in 
claiming a place in the general critique of the higher cognitive powers.”62 Yet judgment’s role is 
more complicated with regard to the science of life – biology – and its claims on our experience of 
organisms as internally coherent unities (i.e. as purposive). Kant claims to maintain his distinction 
between constitutive and regulative principles by allowing for our grasping of an organism as 
purposive and as if designed, while cordoning off this apprehension in the regulative realm of 
reason. This creates a tension between the claims that (a) systematicity and purposiveness do not 
constitute objects or contribute directly to knowledge, but (b) are nonetheless necessary for 
scientific inquiry and the rendering coherent of the diversity of both nature and our experience. 
Through the principle of purposiveness, design and mechanism come together to form a subjective 
yet universally valid judgment that, though not determinate, is nonetheless grounded in the 
cognitive faculties of judgment. But while it is subjective and formal in the aesthetic realm, 
purposiveness in the biological realm is nonetheless real.  
 In order to begin to parse out both the content of a purposive claim and its ability to acquire 
universal validity and necessity, we must first understand such a claim’s peculiar place within 
Kant’s system. While purposiveness is denied the legislative authority reserved for the moral law, it 
is nonetheless accorded lawlikeness. The key to understanding this lies in Kant’s claim that 
judgment is not an independent cognitive power.63 Though judgment has its own principle that 
confers its validity, it can only “consider the relation, prior to any concept, in which two powers – 
imagination and understanding – are in a presentation, and thereby perceive, as the object is 
apprehended (by imagination), the object’s subjective purposiveness for the cognitive powers.”64 
                                                
62 Ak. 244’ 
63 “Yet judgment is a very special power, not at all independent: it gives us neither concepts nor ideas of any object 
whatever, whereas understanding does give us such concepts, and reason such ideas” (Ak. 202’).  
64 Ak. 233’ 
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Judgment thus provides the transition that connects the two parts of theoretical and practical 
reason: “This transition is from the sensible substrate of theoretical philosophy to the intelligible 
substrate of practical philosophy.”65 Reflective judgment does not give rise to cognition or 
contribute to its doctrine – i.e. it is not constitutive – but, from the basis of subjective principles, it 
is able to “refer sensible intuitions to an idea of nature in which [nature’s] lawfulness is beyond [our] 
understanding unless [we] relate nature to a supersensible substrate, thus uniting reason in its 
theoretical and practical use in a scientific system.”66    
Purposiveness, as the idea of a whole that precedes and renders coherent the organism’s 
parts, is a special case of systematicity that connects understanding as constitutive and reason as 
legislating to empirical phenomena, in particular to organisms. Though teleological judgments are 
merely reflective and follow the principles of reason, “we can make these judgments only by 
connecting reason with empirical concepts.”67 The place of purposiveness within Kant’s system is 
articulated in his distinction between spontaneous and intentional final causes in nature. The first 
belongs to reflective judgment, the second to determinate judgment. “For the first concept too we 
need reason, but here we need it only in order to engage in experience in terms of principles 
(hence this is reason in its immanent use); but for the second concept reason would have to stray into 
what is excessive [for it] (hence this would be reason in its transcendent use).”68 Whether 
purposiveness is intentional or unintentional must be left indeterminate. Purposiveness is a 
transcendent concept of reason made immanently useful for judgment, i.e. useful in experience.69 
                                                
65 Ak. 246’ 
66 Ak. 246’-247’ 
67 Ak. 243’ 
68 Ak. 235’ 
69 “Hence the concept of natural purposes is a concept solely of reflective judgment, a concept [it must use] solely for its 
own sake in pursuing the causal connection in objects of experience. In [using] a teleological principle for explaining the 
inner possibility of certain natural forms, we leave undetermined whether their purposiveness is intentional or 
unintentional. If a judgment asserted either of these alternatives, it would no longer be merely reflective but would be 
determinative; and the concept of a natural purpose would also no longer be a mere concept of the power of judgment, for 
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Systematicity, as it pertains to purposiveness, thus allows for the mutual maintenance of 
the seemingly contradictory claims of mechanism and teleology in nature. In Understanding Purpose, 
Huneman locates the difference between mechanism and purpose in their divergent causal roles. 
The idea of the whole is not a cause, “hence it is only a principle of knowledge. So the real causes of the 
arrangement of parts must be the parts themselves, which thereby produce one another and their 
relations according – for us – to the idea of the whole.”70 The causal claim in these two cases must be 
different: because mechanism is in tension with purpose, the legitimate use of the principle of 
systematicity depends on its not conflicting with the constitutive principles of understanding.  
 Though it is perceived in experience, purposiveness is not derived from experience. 
Purposiveness enters as an explanatory principle when mechanistic explanation falls short, for 
example when considering the construction of a bird that is so geared for flight that it seems it 
could not have come about by mere mechanism. Yet, that organisms cannot be fully explained 
mechanistically does not account for why the concept of purpose is needed to guide our 
investigation into their structure and workings. Moreover, purposiveness is not meant to function 
as a scientific explanation of organisms because its judgment “does not deal with them mechanically, 
as it were, like an instrument, guided by the understanding and the senses; it deals with them 
artistically, in terms of a principle that is universal but also indeterminate.”71 
 Reflective judgment is thus capable of distinguishing between what Kant terms the 
mechanical and the technical. Determinate judgment regards only the possibility of things 
themselves and hence reduces explanation to mechanical causation,72 while reflective judgment 
                                                                                                                                            
immanent use (i.e., use in experience), but would be connected with a concept of reason: the concept of a cause that we 
posit beyond nature and that acts intentionally, a conept that is transcendent, whether we are in this case judging 
affirmatively or negatively” (Ak. 236’-237’).  
70 Huneman (2007) 87 
71 Ak. 214’ 
72 “The distinction between these two ways of judging natural beings [i.e. the mechanical and technical] is made merely 
by reflective judgment. [Making this distinction is] something that determinative judgment did not (under principles of 
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proceeds according to laws of its own, which operate technically: “this technical procedure is based 
on the technic of nature, and hence on the concept of a purposiveness, a purposiveness we must 
presuppose a priori in nature.”73 Yet, Kant is quick to note, the technic of nature is distinct from 
the mechanism of nature, and hence so are their respective a priori principles: “there is no 
inconsistency whatever between a mechanical explanation of an appearance, which is a task that 
reason performs in terms of objective principles, [and] a technical rule for judging that same object in 
terms of subjective principles of reflection on [such an] object.”74 This is because “insofar as nature’s 
products are aggregates, nature proceeds mechanically, as mere nature; but insofar as its products are 
systems… nature proceeds technically” as art.75  
 Through Kant’s critique of judgment, we thus begin to see a distinct conception of a law of 
nature that is neither determinate nor autonomous, yet is nonetheless validly experienced as a law. 
As Kant repeatedly points out in the First Introduction, the necessary lawfulness of nature is based 
in contingency: “purposiveness is a lawfulness that [something] contingent [may] have [insofar] as 
[it] is contingent.”76 This distinction allows us to understand how an object can fail to be as it is 
supposed to be – the element of contingency underlying reflective judgment – but is nonetheless 
experientially determined by a judgment about how it ought to be. Kant compels us to ask what it 
means to perceive this purposiveness in such a way that it does not determine something about the 
object. Reflective judgment is neither theoretical nor practical because it determines nothing about 
the object or its production: “rather, in them we judge nature itself, though merely by analogy with 
an art, in its subjective relation to our cognitive power, rather than in its objective relation to 
                                                                                                                                            
reason) allow it [to do], as regards the possibility of things themselves, wishing perhaps to have everything reduced to a 
mechanical kind of explanation. [But] reflective judgment certainly can, and perhaps must, permit [geschehen lassen] this 
distinction” (Ak. 218’).  
73 Ak. 248’ 
74 Ak. 218’ 
75 Ak. 217’ 
76 Ak. 217’ 
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objects.”77 Occupying both necessary (mechanical) and technical (teleological) spheres, we must ask 
what it means for an organism to be lawlike and necessary as a purposive system, given that an 
organism can fail to be as it is supposed to be. We must ask, in other words, about what it means 
for an organism to fail to live up to its own standard. 
 
1.3 Nature and norms: the purpose of purposiveness (without purpose) 
 
Purposiveness, as a case of systematicity in which the idea of the whole informs its parts, completes 
Kant’s critical system by pointing beyond theoretical and practical reason to their unified 
functioning in human cognition. The aim of this examination is to make clear the specific regulative 
role of systematicity within Kant’s system, in particular regarding its claims to bridge the gap 
between the theoretical and practical. Yet, the conclusion of this inquiry does not achieve a full 
unification of the sciences of logic, psychology and nature, which remain distinct as a result of 
Kant’s commitment to the regulative.78 Systematicity grounds the idea of unity of the sciences, but 
also proscribes this unity by denying this principle constitutive status.  
The ‘ought’ of the Critique of Judgment is thus different from that of the Critique of Practical 
Reason. The Critique of Judgment is meant to answer the question of legitimacy of our normative 
judgments within experience. But the deeper need for this justification lies in the indeterminacy of 
a coherent system uniting laws of the understanding. The key to understanding this appears in the 
Appendix to the Dialectic and the principle of systematicity. Though the unity of nature is merely 
projected, it nonetheless furnishes a criterion for the rules of the understanding.79 Thus, Kant writes, 
                                                
77 Ak. 201 
78 This leads Hegel to drive the principle of systematicity further by rendering it constitutive, uniting these different 
modes through a history of consciousness. 
79 A647/B675 Op. cit. fn. 7 and 11 
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we have no option but to propose the systematic unity of nature if we are to secure a criterion for 
empirical truth [Merkmal empirischer Wahrheit].80 
 Considered as mere mechanism, the design of nature seems arbitrary. This seeming 
arbitrariness of nature dissatisfies our reason, thus driving us beyond nature to find its 
purposiveness81. When Kant cites the example of a bird, he suggests that mechanism cannot explain 
the unity of the organism because mechanical nature is aimless: “nature, considered as mere 
mechanism, could have structured itself differently in a thousand ways without hitting on precisely 
the unity in terms of a principle of purposes.”82 The worry Kant here expresses in not that 
mechanism is without law, but that its lawfulness is not adequate to explain why an organism is this 
way rather than another – i.e. why it should be this way. 
 The antinomy of teleological judgment aims to establish the compatibility of these two 
modes of knowing (experiencing) an organism. The first maxim regarding mechanical causality is 
given a priori, while judgment adopts its determination of purposiveness by “special experiences, 
experiences that bring reason into play so that we may judge corporeal nature and its laws in terms 
of a special principle.”83 This ‘special principle’ aims to account for why we think of an organism as 
supposed to be this way rather than some other. In laws of inorganic nature we experience an 
                                                
80 A651/B679 Op. cit. p.17 
81 Kant opens the Critique of Teleological Judgment with this thought, expressed in §61 ‘On Objective Purposiveness 
of Nature,’ where he writes: “For when we point, for example, to the structure of birds regarding how their bones are 
hollow, how their wings are positioned to produce motion and their tails to permit steering, and so on, we are saying 
that all of this is utterly contingent if we go by the mere nexus effectivus in nature and do not yet resort to a special kind 
of causality, viz., the causality of purposes (the nexus finalis); in other words, we are saying that nature, considered as 
mere mechanism, could have structured itself differently in a thousand ways without hitting on precisely the unity in 
terms of principles or purposes, and so we cannot hope to find a priori the slightest basis for that unity unless we seek it 
beyond the concept of nature rather than in it” (Ak. 360). In this section, Kant clearly expresses both the need for and 
requirement of creating a special place (within our cognitive functioning rather than in nature) of causality pertaining to 
purposiveness and our experience of nature as causally ordered and yet not mechanistically determined. The need for 
such an explanation both arises from and satisfies our reason.  
82 Ak. 360 
83 Ak. 386 
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inadequacy to account for the organism’s design, which causes us to look for another ground of its 
possibility – something that determines how the organism is supposed to be. 
What we seek in an explanation of organisms is not a causal account of their coming to be – 
i.e. a better mechanistic explanation – but an account of how they conform to our conception of 
how they ought to be. Thus purpose and purposiveness are essentially tied to normativity and only 
incidentally to production by design insofar as explanation by design gives an account of how an 
organism ought to be.84 To regard something as an end is to regard it as conforming to normative 
rules or constraints. Hence something can be an end without the attribution of design because it can 
still be regarded as governed by normative constraints. This distinguishes ‘end’ from a causal 
history: “All that is essential is that it be governed by normative constraints, and that it is 
compatible with its being the product of natural processes rather than design.”85 Kant’s treatment is 
thus an attempt to bridge the gap between understanding things as they are and as they ought to be. 
 Both aesthetic and teleological judgments conform to a law without an antecedent case that 
specifies this law:  
What is common to organic beings and objects of aesthetic appreciation, then, is that they 
both call for recognition of a normative dimension: in the one case, to the way they are, 
and in the other, to their relation to our mental faculties. They both require us to go 
beyond the factual claim that this is how something is, to the normative claim that this is 
how it ought to be.86  
 
We judge that a natural object conforms to a norm through a judgment that a thing is (or fails to be) 
as it ought to be. Further, this normative claim regarding organisms cannot be derived from 
experience because experience only teaches us what things are, not what they ought to be. 
Moreover, this normative component is not contained in every judgment we make. We ascribe 
normative lawlikeness to organic beings, but not to the inorganic world. As Kant notes, I can use a 
                                                
84 Ginsborg (2006) 464 
85 Ginsborg (2006) 464 
86 Ginsborg (1997) 351 
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thing (such as a stone) a certain way, but this does not entail that this is its purpose. Only of an 
organism (such as an eye) do I say that it ought to be such and such a way.87 Hence the organic can 
appear as defective, while the inorganic is merely unsuitable for our purposes. In the case of organic 
beings, we go beyond experience to make this claim, and, as noted throughout Kant’s three 
Critiques, only in going beyond experience can this claim confer the necessity of lawlikeness. 
The contingency of organisms accounts for why there can be irregularities in them without 
requiring us to abandon all claims regarding regularity in organisms and order in nature. When we 
view these irregularities as malfunctions or aberrations, we are not claiming that things cannot 
happen this way for an organism, but that they should not.88 In order to study biological phenomena, 
we must regard them as rule-governed; because they are contingent with regard to the laws of 
matter, the only way that they are rule-governed is normatively. Thus, Kant tells us that “the 
concept of connections and natural forms in terms of purposes does at least serve us as one more 
principle for bringing nature’s appearances under rules in those cases where the causal laws of 
nature’s mere mechanism are not sufficient to allow us to do so.”89 Hence we need a concept of 
purpose that is separate from that of origin. This separate ground of explanation allows that the 
organism’s purposiveness does not conflict with its contingency vis-à-vis mechanical laws. Instead, 
contingency is the condition for the sort of rule an organism follows. 
                                                
87 “That our eyes allow us to see, this we experience directly, and we also experience directly their outer structure and 
their inner structure, which contain the conditions that make it possible to use them in this way, and so we experience 
directly the causality [our eyes involve] in terms of mechanical laws. Now if I use a stone to smash something on it, or 
to build [something] on it, etc., I can [regard] these effects too as purposes [and] refer them to their causes; but that 
does not entitle me to say that the stone was [meant] to serve for building. Only about the eye do I make the judgment 
that it was [meant] to be suitable for sight…I think a necessity in this form and structure of the eye: [the] necessity of 
being built a certain way, namely, in terms of a concept which precedes [the action of] the causes that build this organ, 
and without which (unlike in the case of that stone) no mechnical law of nature will allow me to grasp the possibility of 
that natural product” (Ak. 240’). 
88 Ginsborg (2001) 252 
89 Ak. 360 
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Yet it is not merely the resolution of the antinomy between mechanism and purpose that 
leads Kant to relegate purposiveness to the regulative. The conceptual problem Kant faces is how 
various genera and species can legitimately be brought together in a unified system within which the 
empirical sciences can make valid claims about the order of nature.90 Further, though reason orders 
classificatory concepts of nature and not nature itself, this ordering cannot be arbitrary, but must, 
its subjectivity notwithstanding, accurately (i.e. objectively) classify its objects in their nature.  
Contrary to a reading of purposiveness as applying differently to art and organisms, this 
subjective aspect of judgment unites the two halves of the Critique of Judgment. Insofar as the 
judgment in both cases is not about what is merely there in the object, but about how we are 
supposed to judge this object, judgment is a singular activity. In both cases, judgment in terms of 
purposiveness is guided by normative considerations rather than merely factual observation of 
objects. In speaking of aesthetic judgments, Kant writes:  
 
[Judgments in terms of purposes] claim necessity; they do not say that everyone judges like 
that – in which case the task of explaining them would fall to empirical psychology – but 
say that we ought to judge like that, which amounts to saying that they have for themselves 
an a priori principle. If these judgments, in claiming necessity, did not contain a reference 
to such a principle, we would have to assume it legitimate to assert that the judgment 
ought to hold universally because observation proves that it actually holds universally, and 
to assert, conversely, that from the fact that everyone judges a certain way it follows that 
he also ought to judge that way. But that is obviously absurd.91  
 
                                                
90 A651/B679 Op. cit. fn. 6 and 7. At A654-655/B682-683, Kant further elaborates: “The logical principle of genera 
therefore presupposes a transcendental one if it is to be applied to nature (by which I here understand only objects that 
are given to us). According to that principle, sameness of kind is necessarily presupposed in the manifold of a possible 
experience (even though we cannot determine its degree a priori), because without it no empirical concepts and hence 
no experience would be possible./To the logical principle of genera which postulates identity there is opposed another, 
namely that of species, which needs manifoldness and variety in things despite their agreement under the same genus, 
and prescribes to the understanding that it be no less attentive to variety than to agreement. This principle (of 
discrimination, or of the faculty of distinguishing) severely limits the rashness of the first principle (of wit); and here 
reason shows two interests that conflict with each other: on the one side, an interest in the domain (universality) in 
regard to genera, on the other an interest in content (determinacy) in respect of the manifoldness of species; for in the 
first case the understanding thinks much under its concepts, while in the second it thinks all the more in them.” 
91 Ak. 239’ 
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Kant unites the subjectivity of reflective judgments with their universality through the principle of 
sociality, which links the subjectivity of our judgments, giving them their universal scope. 
Objectivity in judgment is not a claim on the object, but rather a claim about our sociality. The 
validity of our judgments is based on our agreement as humans sharing a rational framework. This 
theory of validity in judgment resonates with Kant’s demarcation of transcendental ideas as 
emanating from reason alone. Yet, if this is the case, the question then becomes one similar to that 
of our ability to know the inner nature of things, namely, if these constraints issue from reason 
alone, how can we be assured that they ground our claims regarding nature rather than being 
merely regulative?  
The key to understanding how aesthetic and teleological judgments are normative claims 
based in sociality lies in Kant’s above claim that purposive judging does not make an empirical claim 
about how an object is or what a work means, but a normative claim about how an organism or a 
work of art ought to be. For Kant, this judgment is transcendental and hence necessary precisely 
because it does not emanate from the empirical. In fact, Kant finds it absurd to think that we could 
derive such a normative claim from an empirical observance that others also judge an object in this 
way. Moreover, normative judgment does not assert that one will judge a work this way, or even 
that an organism will be this way: the necessity involved in an aesthetic or teleological judgment is 
not logical and is not derived from a determinate principle. Nonetheless, teleological judgments 
make reference to – and indeed are impossible without – an a priori principle of our sociality, not as 
an actual connection with others, but as a shared cognitive framework.92  
                                                
92 Reflective judgments “do not say that everyone judges like that – in which case the task of explaining them would fall 
to empirical psychology – but say that we ought to judge like that, which amounts to saying that they have for 
themselves an a priori principle. If these judgments, in claiming necessity, did not contain a reference to such a 
principle, we would have to assume it legitimate to assert that the judgment ought to hold universally because 
observation proves that it actually holds universally, and to assert, conversely, that from the fact that everyone judges a 
certain way it follows that he also ought to judge that way. But that is obviously absurd” (Ak. 239’). 
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Kant locates normativity as a central component of our judgment of organisms. He accepts 
the basis of scientific explanation in mechanistic causality that was widely accepted in the biological 
sciences of his time, but is deeply ambivalent about its ability to adequately account for our real 
experience of purposiveness. Thus, while Kant notes the limits of mechanistic explanation with 
respect to organisms, the real limit of mechanistic accounts has to do with our own nature: 
mechanism is inadequate to explain our experience of organisms and the role our cognition plays 
therein. Kant’s particular – and peculiar – presentation of ideas contributes to a rational, non-
mechanistic theory of causality that is not that of the autonomy of practical reason, but that of a 
normativity deeply connected to theoretical cognition. 
 Kant thus locates teleological judgment centrally within the triad of critical questions 
concerning what I can know, should do, and can hope for. Yet, we are compelled to ask what it is 
about theoretical and practical reason that leads Kant to place judgment within their critique. We 
get a glimpse at an answer towards the end of the ‘Critique of Teleological Judgment,’ where Kant 
begins to carve out the place of purposiveness as necessary for our human judgment.93 Both 
theoretical and practical reason truck in universal laws, but particulars cannot be determined in 
their contingency (i.e. their particularity) through the universal. Judgment fills in this gap by giving 
content to the underdetermined universal and allows us to grasp the lawlikeness of particulars. This 
opens onto a deeper understanding of our ethical being through a propaedeutic of sociality that is 
simultaneously universal and sympathetic/communicative.94 
                                                
93 “Hence the concept of purposiveness that nature displays in its products must be one that, while not pertaining to the 
determination of objects themselves, is nevertheless a subjective principle that reason has for our judgment, since this 
principle is necessary for human judgment in dealing with nature. The principle is regulative (not constitutive), but it 
holds just as necessarily for our human judgment as it would if it were an objective principle” (Ak. 404). 
94 In the final section before the Critique of Teleological Judgment, ‘On the Methodology Concerning Taste,’Kant 
introduces the principle of sociality in reflective judgments: “The propaedeutic [of taste in art] does not consist in 
[following] precepts but in cultivating our mental powers by exposing ourselves beforehand to what we call humaniora; 
they are called that presumably because humanity [Humanität] means both the universal feeling of sympathy, and the 
ability to engage universally in very intimate communication. When these two qualities are combined, they 
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1.4 The ends of purposiveness 
 
Normative phenomena, in the Critique of Judgment, make claims on others (in aesthetic judgment) or 
about organic life (in teleological judgment). Both are based in the subject’s judgment, yet are 
conferred universal validity as self-grounding in judgment. This validity serves to justify our 
scientific inquiry as well as to legitimate its findings, while remaining within the bounds of a 
regulative or heuristic principle. In the ‘Critique of Teleological Judgment,’ Kant is dealing, not 
with the peculiarities of the organism, but with the peculiarities of our explanations of organisms. 
Reason’s idea of systematicity unites our experience, despite the fact that unity runs aground at the 
limits of our possible experience. The failure of this unity is nowhere more dissatisfying than in the 
gap between our experience of the development of organisms and that of our own human 
development in history. As we have seen, given the limits Kant sets for possible experience and the 
criterion that reason be autonomous, the demand for unity cannot be satisfied directly. 
Nonetheless, there is a way that this demand for unity is satisfied in Kant’s treatment of culture, 
which presents itself as humankind’s proper domain. 
At the end of the Critique of Judgment, Kant returns us to ourselves by identifying culture 
(Kultur) as the ultimate purpose of nature as a teleological system.95 Through our encounter with 
organisms, we learn about our own purpose: the achievement of culture. At the end of the Critique 
of Judgment, the fundamental dualisms of Kant’s system stand in persistent tension with the demand 
                                                                                                                                            
constitute the sociability that befits [our] humanity [Menschheit] and distinguishes it from the limitation 
[characteristic] of animals” (Ak. 355). 
95 Kant lays out his argument for culture as the ultimate purpose of nature as a teleological system in §83 ‘On the 
Ultimate Purpose That Nature Has as a Teleological System’ (Ak. 429-434), where he writes: “Hence among all the 
purposes in nature there remains only this [one], as that which nature can accomplish with a view to the final purpose 
outside of nature, and this [one] and subjective condition, namely, man’s aptitude in general for setting himself 
purposes, and for using nature (independently of [the element of] nature in man’s determination of purposes) as a 
means [for achieving them] in conformity with the maxims of his free purposes generally. Producing in a rational being 
an aptitutde for purposes generally (hence [in a way that leaves] that being free) is culture. Hence only culture can be the 
ultimate purpose that we have cause to attribute to nature with respect to the human species” (Ak. 431).  
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for systematic unity, serving to both unite and cleave what Karl Ameriks calls Kant’s ‘modest 
system.’ Though the Critique of Judgment is meant to form the bridge between theoretical and 
practical judgments, the way in which Kant engages empirical concepts simultaneously reinforces 
the distinction between the practical and theoretical, thus describing a unified system that contains 
insurmountable divisions: the pieces of the system hang together, but do not substantively interact. 
Judgments of purposiveness appear as a bridge between mechanistic nature and purpose by design 
by validating the lawlikeness of contingency, reflectively locating the ultimate purpose of nature in 
the pursuit of culture. Culture consequently secures our place as lord of nature through reference 
to a purpose that can be independent of nature.96  
 By recasting the third antinomy of freedom as the antinomy of judgment between 
mechanism and purposiveness, Kant allows for a resolution to the antinomy in experience by 
affirming validity of both mechanistic determinations and rational freedoms. What remains to be 
explored is what this antinomy and its resolution (and the introduction of heautonomy) may mean 
for our experience of freedom.  
 Though Kant’s critical system resolves the antinomy of determinism and freedom and 
delivers a nuanced account of how we unite our experiences in meaningful relation to one another 
through systematicity, he nonetheless reaffirms his distinction between constitutive and regulative 
principles and thereby denies our experiences and the ideas they generate a formative role in our 
cultural development. Hegel takes up Kant’s problematic themes of nature and teleology in his 
Phenomenology of Spirit, recasting them in Life and the dialectical development of forms of life that 
concatenate natural, rational and social life. In making this turn, Hegel unites the divisions in Kant’s 
                                                
96 “Man is indeed the only being on earth that has understanding and hence an ability to set himself purposes of his own 
choice, and in this respect he holds the title of lord of nature; and if we regard nature as a teleological system, then it is 
man’s vocation to be the ultimate purpose of nature, but always subject to a condition: he must have the understanding 
and the will to give both nature and himself reference to a purpose that can be independent of nature, self-sufficient, 
and a final purpose. The final purpose, however, we must not seek within nature at all” (Ak. 431).  
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system, but in so doing, renders problematic the place of freedom that is secured through Kant’s 
proposition of its distinct causality. In the remaining chapters, we will turn to Hegel’s system, 
teasing out his deployment of Life and its relation to the constitutive role of ideas in the dialectical 





HEGEL AND MINDFUL LIFE 
 
Seen through Kant’s critical framework, our experience of organisms reveals a form of 
judgment that is neither practical nor theoretical, but rather forms a bridge between the two. 
Reflective judgment, as Kant understands it, makes the validity of our experience and 
understanding of organized life possible. At the same time, it also delimits our experience of living 
organisms (and ourselves) and thereby limits our connection with natural life. In the Critique of 
Judgment’s treatment of purposiveness, the distinctions between reason and nature that are deployed 
in determining the laws of theoretical and practical reason become troubled in the face of their 
empirical application. Ultimately, however, they are reinforced by Kant’s determination that our 
judgments regarding organisms reveal something about our cognition rather than about organic life. 
Kant’s engagement with life remains an engagement with thinking that, as such, reaffirms the 
distinction between nature and knowledge and forecloses the ability of objects themselves to 
generate knowledge.  
This chapter will turn to Hegel’s dialectical holism as developed in the Phenomenology of 
Spirit, in particular his dialectically holist treatment of Life, as addressing the gaps identified in 
Kant’s system that presuppose, and thus confirm, a schism between natural and rational life. The 
critique of this segregation forms the grounds of Hegel’s criticism of Kant and, I will argue, Hegel 
primarily casts this limitation as epistemological rather than metaphysical. As Hegel underscores 
throughout the development of forms of consciousness in the Phenomenology, by distinguishing 
between regulative and constitutive principles in order to make space for empirical concepts that 
can extend but not generate knowledge, Kant forecloses a deeper understanding of the role that 
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history and institutions play in the formation of our ethical selves and our possibilities for achieving 
freedom within these determinations. Still, Hegel does not abandon the project of a scientific 
system of inquiry that generates valid claims. He takes up Kant’s challenge laid out in the Appendix 
to the Critique of Pure Reason to pursue a coherency of experience that goes beyond the limitations of 
the understanding. In so doing, Hegel ushers in a new form of idealism that is also, at its core, a 
reworked naturalism.  
In both Kant and Hegel, life appears on the occasion of examining experience’s coherence. 
Kant distinguishes between the validity of a judgment arising from experience through the function 
of understanding, and the coherency of experience made possible (though not valid) through the 
regulative principle of systematic interconnection. Hegel eschews Kant’s distinction, furthering his 
assertion that judgments about experience can only be valid or true in coherent (i.e. systematic) 
connection to other judgments or truth-claims. In the Preface to the Phenomenology Hegel equates 
science with ‘knowledge’ or ‘knowledge in general.’97 In Hegel’s systematic exposition of 
knowledge, one cannot know truths disaggregated from the whole. He thereby rejects Kant’s 
distinction between the validity and coherency of experience and, by extension, repudiates the 
associated distinctions between Understanding and Reason and their constitutive and regulative 
principles. More importantly, Hegel’s reworking of experience’s coherency undermines Kant’s 
fundamental distinction between things in themselves and objects of possible experience. Hegel’s 
holist demand requires that things in themselves not be left behind. As we will see, Hegel engages 
the object in its independence without subsuming it within reason or leaving us only its naturalistic 
determination. 
                                                
97 “Pure self-recognition in absolute otherness, this Aether as such, is the ground and soil of Science or knowledge in 
general” (Phen 14, ¶26) and “It is this coming-to-be of Science as such or of knowledge, that is described in this 
Phenomenology of Spirit” (Phen 15, ¶27). 
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By juxtaposing his living system with Kant’s lifeless determinations, Hegel is juxtaposing 
Kant’s method, in which the subject constitutes the object to be what it is for us, to his own method 
in which the subject recognizes the object in its self-motion (self-determination). Life is thus 
fundamental to Hegel’s project and his post-critical (i.e. post-Kantian) system, not for its 
substantial meaning or even heuristic function, but for what it represents, viz. the distinction 
between determination and self-determination of the other.  
This chapter will defend the thesis that Hegel successfully bridges the gap between reason 
and nature through casting Life as the object’s self-determination; this is a necessary moment in the 
dialectical development of self-consciousness and hence points to a primordial state of unity 
between nature and reason that does not revert to a pre-critical monism but rather requires a 
dialectical holism to be made intelligible. Where Kant’s system both presupposes and discovers a 
gap between rational and natural life, Hegel pushes beyond (or before) this dualism by recasting his 
distinction between rational and natural life as two aspects of an integrated whole, arising from a 
united beginning in Life. Continuing to explore the theme of the (dis)continuity of human and 
biological life through the epistemological-normative lens of purposiveness, we will see how Hegel 
denies the grounds of Kant’s distinction between the theoretical and practical and hence between 
regulative and constitutive principles. Ultimately, Hegel undoes Kant’s distinction between 
understanding and reason, bringing both in to congress with experience and into his philosophical 
system in a way that allows experience to contribute to, rather than detract from, knowledge. By 
collapsing Kant’s distinction between regulative and constitutive ideas, Hegel’s holism drives 
beyond Kant’s system and allows for a more comprehensive accounting of human knowing. In so 
doing, Hegel reconnects natural and epistemic life through a post-critical stance that brings to light 
forms of consciousness as forms of life. In so doing, Hegel delivers us into a space for thinking 
together our determination and freedom by setting cultural life and the independence of the object 
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in a dialectical relation. But to start, we must turn to the first appearance of Life, where Hegel 
integrates the independent object in his system, thus moving beyond Kant’s lifeless determinations. 
 
2.1 Engendering life 
 
Hegel’s early writings are marked by a preoccupation with the natural sciences. In his dissertation 
on the orbital rotation of the planets and in The Spirit of Christianity, Hegel already begins to explore 
a nuanced interconnection of reason and nature. These early writings focus on the movement of 
natural things, shifting from a physics to a geometry of motion and causality. This rethinking of the 
relation among natural things and of the positivity imposed on them by understanding lays the 
groundwork for a new articulation of system and the concordant philosophy of reconciliation 
between nature and reason as articulated in Hegel’s first full work, The Difference Between Fichte’s and 
Schelling’s System of Philosophy, where life first comes to play a central role in Hegel’s thought.98  
Hegel’s Difference essay takes up the development of Kant’s thought in the systems of Fichte 
and Schelling, both of whom attempted to create a system unified in the Absolute that brings 
together all that remains disparate in Kant’s system. For a majority of his examination of the 
Absolute in Schelling and Fichte, Hegel dwells on art and nature as key concepts for unlocking the 
unity that Kant points to in the Critique of Judgment. While Hegel argues that Kant provides the tools 
to achieve this unity through his treatment of art and nature, Hegel nonetheless criticizes Kant’s 
system as incomplete insofar as he maintains a distinction between intellect [understanding] and 
Reason. For Hegel, this belies an imperfect form of thought that has not yet reached proper 
reconciliation within Reason. Hegel takes up Kant’s critical project to create a unified philosophical 
system, laying the groundwork for this system’s development in the Phenomenology of Spirit.   
                                                
98 This analysis of Hegel’s early writing pulls heavily from Olivier Depré’s examination of life in Hegel’s early works in 
his essay “Le rôle du concept de vie de Francfort à Iéna” in Hegel et La Vie, Ed. Jean-Louis Vieillard-Baron. 
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In “The Art of Nature,” Allan Hance explores Hegel’s connection to the Critique of Judgment 
through his philosophy of nature and life. Hance notes a similarity between Kantian reflective 
judgment and Hegelian dialectic: “The structural similarity between reflective judgment and 
dialectical reason is that both attempt to adduce the whole that enables one to contextualize and so 
make sense of an isolated part (or set of parts) whose significance is unclear.”99 As we have seen, for 
Kant, this connection remains regulative rather than constitutive. Kant’s bridge between 
theoretical and practical judgments ultimately reaffirms their separation by remaining consistently 
faithful to the limits of what we can validly know. By contrast, Hegel’s holism denies these 
distinctions that ground Kantian knowledge. In so doing, Hegel reworks the definition of 
knowledge by giving constitutive weight to the interconnection of all parts within his holist system. 
In Contradiction in Motion, Susan Songsuk Hahn draws a close parallel between the function 
of natural life in Kant and Hegel: “Nature in its beauty… discloses to us the idea of life and by 
doing so gives us a clue into the workings of our own living nature.”100 For both Kant and Hegel, 
the beauty and order of nature serve a heuristic function in our own self-awareness and knowledge. 
As heuristics, organisms and artworks teach us something about the structure of our cognition, but  
only indirectly, in our judgment regarding their beauty. For Kant, this is a mere disclosure that 
ultimately reaffirms the separation between ourselves and natural beauty and purposiveness. In 
response to this separation, Hegel’s Difference essay reworks the unification of nature and beauty 
within speculative philosophy. In so doing, Hegel reworks the heuristic of biological life as 
ultimately elucidating our own judgment. Nature’s teleology comes to function as a trope within 
Hegel’s writing that connects us to, rather than distinguishes us from, the flux of life.  
                                                
99 Hance 40 
100 Hahn 81 
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Kant’s relegation of experience’s coherence to a regulative principle arises from his basic 
distinction between objects as they are for us and things as they are in themselves. Because we 
cannot know the thing in itself, we also cannot make substantive claims about its causal 
connections. Thus the limitations imposed on knowledge as a precondition of its validity are the 
same conditions that delimit any knowledge of the interaction of subjects with objects. Hegel 
nowhere more poetically states this limitation in Kant than in the Phenomenology where, at the 
moment of self-consciousness’ self-certainty derived in opposition to some other, he writes: 
Certain of the nothingness of this other, [the self] explicitly affirms that this 
nothingness is for it the truth of the other; it destroys the independent object and 
thereby gives itself the certainty of itself as a true certainty, a certainty which has 
become explicit for self-consciousness itself in an objective manner.101 
 
In contrast to the reflexive turns in Kant, in which our knowledge of an object is the site for 
uncovering knowledge of our own cognition, Hegel describes a different object that is neither the 
object of experience nor the thing in itself – an object that is independent. As the subject returns to 
itself from an encounter with an object, there remains a gap between knowing and the object that 
cannot be bridged within knowing.102 Kant’s systematic proscription on objects that are both 
intelligible and independent of our cognition does not mind this gap, but reverts to the primacy of 
knowing. In contrast, by admitting the object to appear in its independence, Hegel bridges this gap 
within knowing, constituting both the subject and the object through their interconnection and 
making them intelligible within a systematic whole. This self-determination of the object radically 
                                                
101 Phen 109, ¶174 
102 “Opposed to an other, the ‘I’ is its own self, and at the same time it overarches this other which, for the ‘I,’ is 
equally only the ‘I’ itself./ With self-consciousness, then, we have therefore entered the native realm of truth. We 
have now to see how the shape of self-consciousness first makes its appearance. If we consider this new shape of 
knowing, the knowing of itself, in relation to that which preceded it, viz. the knowing of an other, then we see that 
though this other has indeed vanished, its moments have at the same time no less been preserved, and the loss consists 
in this, that here they are present as they are in themselves… Thus it seems that only the principle moment iself has 
been lost, viz. the simple self-subsistent existence for consciousness. But in point of fact self-consciousness is the reflection 
out of the being of the world of sense and perception, and is essentially the return from otherness”  (Phen 104-105, ¶166-
167). 
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reworks the role our experience plays in generating both the form and content of our cognition, 
and ultimately of our self-determination in freedom. Life activates the limits of our knowledge, not 
because it is beyond experience, but because it is opaque within our experience. Life in the other is 
recognized, but only understood as analogous to my own. How, then, do we place Life in a system 
of knowledge? 
 The Difference Essay begins Hegel’s apologia for speculative philosophy, the philosophy of 
the identity of subject and object103 or holist systematicity. Contra Kant, Hegel argues that  
systematic philosophy cannot both delimit its bounds and achieve the validity of its claims. Reason, 
Hegel writes, achieves the Absolute only when it leaves behind the ‘manifold of parts’: “The more 
stable and splendid the edifice of the intellect is, the more restless becomes the striving of the life 
that is caught up in it as a part to get out of it, and raise itself to freedom.”104 Here Life is presented 
as a substrate connected to desire that engenders movement against the ‘edifice’ of intellect 
(understanding). This striving of Life is a call of the object and an internal demand for a unified 
system that fully accounts for the object’s life. 
In the Preface to the Phenomenology, Hegel critiques past systems of philosophy for falling 
prey to transcendental methodologies: these systems appear to grasp the unity of things within the 
absolute Idea, “but a closer inspection shows that this expansion [of the content of knowledge] has 
not come about through one and the same principle having spontaneously assumed different shapes, 
but rather through the shapeless repetition of one and the same formula, only externally applied to 
diverse materials.”105 By undergoing the experience of the development of Spirit in its historical 
unfolding, Hegel leads himself and his reader through its internal unfolding to deliver us to an 
achieved truth of systematic principles developed out of this unfolding rather than imposed upon it. 
                                                
103 “The principle of speculation is the identity of subject and object” (DS 80). 
104 DS 90 
105 Phen 8, ¶15 
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In the ‘Preface,’ Hegel uses the metaphor of the bud and the blossom, carrying forward the trope 
of organic life as a tool for elucidating epistemic life. The interplay of organic and epistemic life 
forms the movements of Hegel’s Phenomenology, creating both the unification and tension that drives 
the developmental narrative towards Absolute Knowing.  
 
2.2 The meaning of life 
 
Life appears as a leitmotif throughout Hegel’s writings; where Life opens the narrative of Self-
Consciousness in the Phenomenology, it closes the systematic exposition of the Science of Logic in the 
third book on the Idea. It is the primordial position that is both subject and object – a fundamental 
unity that must be posited in order to reunite the diremption of nature and freedom. Yet Life is not 
presented in a straightforward manner, demarcated and explored, as are, for instance, the Notion 
and the Absolute. Rather, Hegel uses Life as a lever against his primary targets of inquiry. To 
understand the meaning of Life in Hegel’s Phenomenology, we must pay attention to the words that 
surround Life and its appearances through the Phenomenology’s narrative.  
In both the Difference Essay and the Preface to the Phenomenology, Hegel places a premium 
on the dynamism of concepts engendered by their immanent dialectical motion, juxtaposing the 
living concept to Kant’s lifeless understanding. Hegel writes in the Difference essay that Kant can 
only conceive of phenomena mathematically, not dynamically.106 In the Preface to the 
Phenomenology, Hegel further criticizes Kant for rendering the triadic form that Hegel also leverages 
“lifeless and uncomprehended” through his schema.107 Hegel continuously uses the adjective 
‘lifeless’ attached to descriptions of the sort of formal philosophy that Kant brings to its ultimate 
                                                
106 “[Kant] conceives matter simply as the objective, as that which is opposed to the Ego. For him, attractive and 
repulsive forces are not merely superfluous; they are either purely ideal, in which case they are not forces, or else they 
are transcendent. The only construction of phenomena that he can allow is mathematical, not dynamical” (DS 164). 
107 Phen 29, ¶50 
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form. The Preface is rife with metaphors of nature and dynamic adjectives, but the word ‘Life’ 
dominates the text, appearing throughout the Preface in various contexts. When Life appears in the 
text, it appears as a substantive noun, but Life is not juxtaposed to death. The word ‘lifeless, which 
is the pertinent grammatical contrary, is translated from several variations, including unlebendige 
(¶3), leblosen (¶51-52) and toter (¶51), but it never appears as a substantive, standalone noun. 
Rather, Life is pitted philosophically against understanding and determinations that are described as 
‘lifeless’ when taken up in a certain way,108 as when Hegel refers to the ‘lifeless determinations’ and 
‘lifeless Understanding.’109 Still, it is not immediately clear why Hegel places this premium on 
living motion in systematic philosophy or how the movement of thought is connected to Life in 
Hegel’s text.  
Hegel applies characteristics of biological life (self-preservation and reproduction) to 
concepts. Life as dialectical motion in cognition is described in the Science of Logic, where Life 
appears in the Notion in General at the junction of nature and spirit: “Life, or organic nature, is the 
stage of nature at which the Notion emerges, but as blind, as unaware of itself and unthinking; the 
Notion that is self-conscious and thinks pertains solely to spirit.”110 Later in the Science of Logic, 
Hegel defines Life in a tripartite relation of sensibility, irritability and reproduction.111 The three 
                                                
108 “Even when the specific determinateness… is in itself concrete or real, the Understanding degrades it into 
something lifeless, merely predicating it of another existent thing, rather than cognizing it as the immanent life of the 
thing, or cognizing its native and unique way of generating and expressing itself in that thing” (Phen 32, ¶53). 
109 “This monochromatic character of the schema and its lifeless determinations, this absolute identity, and the 
transition from one to the other, are all equally products of the lifeless Understanding and external cognition” (Phen 31, 
¶51). 
110 SL 586  
111 “Thus [Life] is in the first place universality, the purely internal vibration of vitality, or sensibility… Sensibility may 
therefore be regarded as the determinate being of the inwardly existent soul, since it receives all externality into itself, 
while reducing it to the perfect simplicity of self-similar universality./ The second determination of the Notion is 
particularity, the moment of the posited difference, the opening up of the negativity that is locked up in simple self-
feeling, or is an ideal, not yet a real, determinateness in it, that is, irritability… The precise determination of this 
reflection-into-self is such that in irritability, the living being is its own externality to itself, to the objectivity which it 
possesses immediately as its means and instrument, and which is externally determinable. The reflection-into-self 
sublates this immediacy – on the side as a theoretical reflection, that is, in so far as the negativity is present as the 
simple moment of sensibility that was considered in the latter and which constitutes feeling – on the other side as real 
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moments relate to one another, first through self-unity, then diremption and ultimately as 
reconciliation of its fundamental unity.112 Self-consciousness too has three moments: 1) ‘I’ taken as 
immediate object; 2) the diremption of this immediacy in Desire, in which the I realizes it is already 
mediated by the other; 3) the unity of self and other in which self-consciousness becomes ‘living 
self-consciousness.’113 This dialectic of unification and diremption in Life is essential to the 
development of Absolute Knowing, uniting subject and substance. Moreover, Hegel writes, the 
Concept is a stage of nature as well as of Spirit,114 indicating a full and primordial integration of 
rational and organic life.  
In Hegel, Life is a concept used to refer not only to nature but also to the origination and 
movement of consciousness as it folds back onto itself in recognition that is informed by an other. 
Life contains not only the movement of thought but also the dialectical structure of its 
development. Life first appears on the scene as a call from something external to the intellect. This 
introduction of Life also introduces several key themes that will receive articulation in the 
developmental story of Spirit and its accompanying truth: struggle, desire, independence of the 
                                                                                                                                            
reflection, in that the unity of the Notion posits itself in its external objectivity as negative unity; this is reproduction. The 
first two moments, sensibility and irritability, are abstract determinations; in reproduction life is concrete and is 
vitality… Reproduction is the negativity as simple moment of sensibility, and irritability is only a living power of 
resistance, so that the relationship to the external is reproduction and individual identity with self” (SL 768-769). 
112 For a full account of the life-process, see SL 770-772, which Hegel concludes: “In this coming together of the 
individual and its objectivity, that at first was presupposed as indifferent to it, the individual, which on one side has 
constituted itself an actual unity, has none the less sublated its particularity and raised itself to universality. Its particularity 
consisted in the diremption by which life posited as its species the individual life and the objectivity external to it. 
Through the external life process it has thus posited itself as real universal life, that is, as genus” (SL 772). 
113 “The notion of self-consciousness is only completed in these three moments: (a) the pure undifferentiated ‘I’ is its 
first immediate object. (b) But this immediacy is itself an absolute mediation, it is only as a supersession of the 
independent object, in other words, it is Desire. The satisfaction of Desire is, it is true, the reflection of self-
consciousness into itself, or the certainty that has become truth. (c) But the truth of this certainty is really a double 
reflection, the duplication of self-consciousness. Consciousness has for its object one which, of its own self, posits its 
otherness or difference as a nothingness, and in so doing is independent. The differentiated, merely living, shape does 
indeed also supersede its independence in the process of Life, but it ceases with its distinctive difference to be what it 
is. The object of self-consciousness, however, is equally independent in this negativity of itself; and thus it is for itself a 
genus, a universal fluid element in the peculiarity of its own separate being; it is a living self-consciousness” (Phen 110, 
¶176). 
114 “The Notion is to be regarded not as the act of the self-conscious understanding, not as the subjective understanding, 
but as the Notion in its own absolute character which constitutes a stage of nature as well as of spirit” (SL 586).  
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object and the movement inherent to truth as opposed to the incomplete and false appearance of 
the intellect, which can merely grasp at truth without realizing it.   
 The aspectival nature of conceptual thinking, by which we make distinctions and 
demarcations in order to grasp as concept what is part of a larger whole, and its unification in 
Absolute Knowing are made possible from this fundamental position of interconnection in Life. 
Biological life is intimately connected to the categorization that marks conceptual thinking. Genus 
and species are concepts that arise from biological life, yet, for Hegel, these concepts are frustrating 
to Life, understood as primordial dynamism: “the process of Life… is just as much an imparting of 
shape as a supersession of it.”115 The categorization of Life and living things fails as we try to grasp 
them; it is in both this attempt and its failure that Life is dialectical movement and, as such, is 
conceptualization.  
In the first few passages on Life, Hegel most clearly takes on Kant’s language in the Critique 
of Judgment: “It is the simple genus which, in the movement of Life itself, does not exist for itself qua 
this simple determination; on the contrary, in this result [universal unity], Life points to something 
other than itself, viz. to consciousness, for which Life exists as this unity, or as genus.”116 Life points 
to consciousness precisely because the unity and classification of Life reveals to us our own 
consciousness rather than something determinate about the object. We don’t merely perceive the 
object as in Consciousness but, through our recognition, it becomes living. For Hegel, this is the 
Kantian thought that must be overcome. 
In the Phenomenology, Life first makes its appearance as the object. Just as self-consciousness 
comes from consciousness’ reflection into itself, so too does Life come from the object’s reflection 
into itself on the other side of this relation. Hegel’s turn to Self-Consciousness in the narrative of 
                                                
115 Phen 108, ¶171 
116 Phen 108-109, ¶ 172 
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the Phenomenology opens with a story of Life as the primordial unity out of which the dualities of 
subject and object arise. Life first appears in the third paragraph of Self-Consciousness as a reflective 
moment in the transition from Consciousness to its self-awareness: “But, for us, or in itself, the 
object which for self-consciousness is the negative element has, on its side, returned into itself, just 
as on the other side consciousness has done. Through this reflection into itself the object has 
become Life.”117 This is merely the first moment of the experience of Life, however, insofar as self-
consciousness and Life stand in opposition.  
Though Life is presented as the fundamental position out of which the distinction between 
self and other arise, as well as the unity to which these dualities return, Life itself is an achieved 
notion in the development of self-consciousness, beginning in the experience of the object in its 
independence: the “determination of Life… has issued from the Notion.”118 We see this thought 
developed in the Phenomenology, where the independence contained in the object and manifest as 
Life becomes essential to our own self-conscious development. For Hegel, as Hance writes, “not 
only mind or the subject but also nature or the object is something (implicitly) self-determining… 
in life the subject and the object subsist as an as yet undifferentiated unity… The organism is rather 
the object that is on the way to becoming a subject: it is the Concept as it is in itself but not yet in 
and for itself.”119  
Hegel’s articulation of Life adds something essential to Kant’s reflexive turn to self 
knowledge: the object as living returns us to ourselves, mediated by the independence of the 
object. For Hegel, the moment of supersession of the other is just the beginning of the dialectic. 
The narrative of the Phenomenology is driven by the failed capacity of a proposition to provide the 
satisfaction it promises because the independence of the object continues to assert itself, unseating 
                                                
117 Phen 106, ¶168 
118 Phen 106, ¶169 
119 Hance 52 
60 
the solidity of any single proposition. Conceptual thinking is contained within Life and arises into 
consciousness and ultimately, upon achieving its own independence through an encounter with the 
independence of the object, becomes self-conscious.  
For Hegel, Life becomes a central concept for revealing demands specific to self-conscious 
knowing. It arises in response to a question regarding our ability to know objects external to 
ourselves (and ultimately ourselves) in their self-motion. Negativity and the independence of the 
object drive a wedge into Kant’s self-enclosed account in which our knowing the other returns us 
to knowledge of ourselves. In the sphere of Life, negation is present in an other as something 
determinate in relation to some indifferent form, or “as the organic universal nature of Life.”120 The 
object appears as the negative element for self-consciousness, and returns to itself just as self-
consciousness does: “Through this reflection into itself, the object has become Life.”121 In this 
notion, the unity of consciousness and of the object, each on its own side, is also repulsion, creating 
an antithesis of self-consciousness and life in which the object is in itself and self-consciousness is for 
itself.122 Our experience of the object as independent not only bifurcates self from other, but also 
sparks their reunification through awareness. This in turn leads to self-consciousness through the 
coming to awareness of self in relation to an other: “Since the object is in its own self negation, and 
in being so is at the same time independent, it is consciousness.”123 Consciousness is first the 
movement of immersion in the object, with the reflexive pulling back into the self the first moment 
of self-consciousness. Both alone are incomplete moments of the dialectic, but as a whole they take 
on new meaning in Life. 
                                                
120 Phen 100, ¶175 
121 Phen 106, ¶168 
122 “But this unity is, as we have seen, just as much its repulsion from itself; and this Notion sunders itself into the 
antithesis of self-consciousness and life: the former is the unity for which the infinite unity of the differences is; the 
latter, however, is only this unity itself, so that it is not at the same time for itself” (Phen 106, ¶168). 
123 Phen 109-110, ¶ 175 
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 Life arises at the limits of grasping the object in Consciousness: “the object of immediate 
desire is a living being” that in consciousness is grasped as independent only implicitly.124 Self-
consciousness renders the independence of the object explicit through the experience of its 
independence. What we are led to ask from Hegel’s text is why, at the juncture in which the 
independence of the object becomes an object of our experience, does Life appear? The Concept 
emerges in the failure to fully grasp objects conceptually; this failure is where we are thrown back 
towards Life as the liminal space in which the other expresses its independence.  
Throughout Self-Consciousness, Hegel outlines the process of diremption and 
reconciliation between the self and other that are one in Life. Though it engenders this movement, 
Life itself fluctuates between a static and dynamic concept, with the dynamic flow of life and our 
apprehension of this dynamism an achievement in the development of self-conscious Spirit. Hegel 
breaks out the moments of Life in the dialectical movement towards self-consciousness:  
…we have, as the first moment, the subsistence of the independent shapes, or the 
suppression of what diremption is in itself, viz. that the shapes have no being in 
themselves, no enduring existence. The second moment, however is the subjection 
of that existence to the infinity of the difference. In the first moment there is the 
existent shape; as being for itself, or being in its determinateness infinite substance, 
it comes forward in antithesis to the universal substance, disowns this fluent 
continuity with it and asserts that it is not dissolved in this universal element, but 
on the contrary preserves itself by separating itself from this its inorganic nature, 
and by consuming it. Life in the universal fluid medium, a passive separating-out of 
the shapes becomes, just by so doing, a movement of those shapes or being Life as 
a process. The simple universal fluid medium is the in-itself, and the difference of the 
shapes is the other. But this fluid medium itself becomes the other through this 
difference; for now it is for the difference which exists in and for itself, and 
consequently is the ceaseless movement by which this passive medium is 
consumed: Life as a living thing.125 
 
Life is process, driven by both dynamism and diremption. Life is the creation, destruction and 
preservation of both dependence and independence of the object. The whole activity of both the 
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immediate and mediated experience of objects is contained within Life. Life is not one moment in 
the dialectic, but “consists rather in being the self-developing whole which dissolves its 
development and in this movement simply preserves itself.”126 Otherwise stated, Life is the 
substratum of the development of Spirit.  
If Life is the substratum of the development of Spirit, the flow of Life achieves a concrete 
expression in the dialectic of master and slave. In his treatment of the master/slave dialectic, Hegel 
addresses the correlation between Life, the object in its immediacy and the development of self-
consciousness. In the contexts of struggle and work between two self-conscious beings, but also 
between a self-conscious being and nature, individuality reappears in its connection to Life. Self-
consciousness begins in simple being-for-self;127 this original being-for-self is obtained through a 
negative relation in which the self separates itself from all other things. When two self-conscious 
beings first meet in the mythic space of their primordial encounter, they are as two self-submerged 
objects, immersed in their own immediacy. Appearing thus, they are “individuals submerged in the 
being [or immediacy] of Life – for the object in its immediacy is here determined as Life.”128 The 
struggle to the death that arises in the encounter between two being-for-selves is a result of the 
detachment from Life that arises from the perception of our own independence.129 In the first 
moment of the dialectical movement, the self seeks the death of the other, only to return to herself, 
realizing that to affect the death of the other she must stake her own life.  The desire for self-
                                                
126 Phen 108, ¶171 
127 “Self-consciousness is, to begin with, simple being-for-self, self-equal through the exclusion from itself of everything 
else” (Phen 113, ¶186).  
128 Phen 113, ¶186 
129 “The presentation of itself, however, as the pure abstraction of self-consciousness consists in showing itself as the 
pure negation of its objective mode, or in showing that it is not attached to any specific existence, not to the individuality 
common to existence as such, that it is not attached to life. This presentation is a twofold action: action on the part of 
the other, and action on its own part. In so far as it is the action of the other, each seek the death of the other. But in 
doing so, the second kind of action, action on its own part, is also involved; for the former involves the staking of its 
own life” (Phen 113, ¶187). 
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preservation brings awareness of one self in relation to another to the fore, thus spurring the 
dialectical development towards self-consciousness in its fullness. 
Contained in the dialectical development of self-consciousness is not only Life, but also the 
desire that informs its movements. Where diremption drives the development of self-consciousness 
in struggle, desire unifies. Both moments are contained in Life. The sphere of Life both fosters and 
is the object of Desire.  
 
2.3 Desiring life 
 
In Self-Consciousness, Life becomes synonymous with desire. Hegel’s Life is a social network of 
anthropogenic demands and satisfactions established through intersubjective interaction. Viewed 
through this lens, the Phenomenology is a demonstration of the development of consciousness that has 
become aware of itself in the context of its accompanying human agency. The individual agent is an 
achievement of struggle and historical development that takes shape through encounters with other 
living agents. As such, the character and demands of desire are conditioned by appearances and 
their experience. Hence Hegel’s notion of desire is subject to vicissitudes through the ongoing 
development of forms of consciousness made visible through an understanding of the systematic 
interconnection of disparate objects. 
In Hegel on Self-Consciousness, Robert Pippin locates desire as the link between the concerns 
of Consciousness and the apperceptive turn that marks self-conscious knowledge: “When Hegel 
says that self-consciousness is ‘desire überhaupt’ he means that to be relevant to the question of the 
apperceptive nature of consciousness itself; and that thereby he provides the basis for the claim that 
self-consciousness attains its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness.”130 Pippin here locates a 
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direct continuity between our knowledge of others and the desirousness of our consciousness and 
its reflexive turns.  
Desire manifests itself in this process and is given shape in the context of (and later the self-
conscious encounter with) Life, but its origins are opaque to us. Hegel’s deployment of desire in 
the development of self-conscious agency and freedom is transcendental insofar as it is prior to and 
conditions our experience and knowledge. When Hegel writes that “Self-consciousness is Desire in 
general [Begierde überhau(b)pt or ‘desire itself’],”131 he is setting his concept of desire against 
Kant’s distinction between demand and desire. Within Kant’s system, demands that contribute to 
our knowing are manifestations of reason; desire is primarily biological and, as such, does not find 
its source in reason and detracts from our autonomy. In fact, Kant terms rational desires ‘demands’ 
to distinguish them from natural desires; the source of demand in Kant’s account is external to the 
natural world and our lived experience, even though it is manifest and understood through this 
experience. Hegel makes no such claim to the transcendence of desire’s source. Instead, desire 
unfolds from the felt disunification and drive for unification of self with the object. By collapsing 
the distinction between rational and natural desires into desire in general, Hegel thereby reengages 
experience in the generation of knowledge. 
 Nonetheless, desire’s first appearance in the Phenomenology is antithetical to Life. Arising 
out of consciousness, desire first appears in the context of a supercession of the other and the 
accompanying satisfaction (certainty) of this overcoming. Yet this quest for satisfaction is always 
thwarted: satisfaction in certainty is unseated by experience, which makes us aware of the object’s 
independence: “Desire and the self-certainty obtained in its gratification, are conditioned by the 
object, for self-certainty comes from superseding this other: in order that this supersession can take 
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place, there must be this other.”132 The experience of thwarted desire is the experience of the other 
and is therefore the condition for the development of the conscious self. 
Self (‘I’) first appears out of the encounter with Life as a ‘shaped’ other. It recognizes its 
independence and hence becomes self-consciousness only in reaction to the attempted supercession 
of this other. It is at this juncture that Hegel asserts: “self-consciousness is Desire.”133 Here desire 
becomes a direct correlate for the attempt to grasp (or know) the other, which is accompanied by a 
satisfaction of self-certainty that is itself only to be frustrated by the independence of the object. 
Moreover, this satisfaction is not only frustrated, but also conditioned by the object, because it is 
only through the encounter with the object and the attempt to overcome it that satisfaction is 
(temporarily) derived.134 Negativity is thus an essential moment in desire; it is responsible for both 
the satisfaction and continuation of desire that characterizes self-consciousness and infuses Life into 
knowing. This is perhaps what Hegel means when he writes that the “sphere of Life” is the “object 
of Desire.”135   
In Hegel’s narrative, desire is distinguished from the independence of the object, with a 
focus on the subjective experience of striving in the subject’s need to consume the other. Yet the 
more interesting element of Hegel’s narrative that cannot be separated from the story of desire and 
Life is that of the object’s independence that drives the movement of desirous inquiry by frustrating 
consciousness’ attempt to incorporate the object. Hegel writes: “Self-consciousness, by its negative 
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134 “Certain of the nothingness of this other, [self-consciousness] explicitly affirms that this nothingness is for it the truth 
of the other; it destroys the independent object and thereby gives itself the certainty of itself as a true certainty, a 
certainty which has become explicit for self-consciousness itself in an objective manner./ In this satisfaction, however, 
experience makes it aware that the object has its own independence. Desire and the self-certainty obtained in its 
gratification, are conditioned by the object, for self-certainty comes from superseding this other: in order that this 
supercession can take place, there must be this other” (Phen 109 ¶174-175) 
135 Phen 110, ¶ 175 
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relation to the object, is unable to supersede it.”136 Furthermore, “In this satisfaction, however, 
experience makes it aware that the object has its own independence.”137 Thus the essence of Desire 
lies outside the subject, with the cycle of satisfaction and frustration driven by the object in its 
independence, which is made fruitful through our experience.  
These pages on Life that open the section on ‘Self-Consciousness’ give us the key to 
understanding how Life informs subject/object relations throughout the Phenomenology. Our 
relation to objects is possible because both subject and object begin in Life. The object’s 
independence – and its frustration of our desire’s satisfaction in incorporating the object – drives 
the dialectical interrelation of self and other that forms the grounds of Absolute Knowing; Hegel’s 
account of self-knowledge allows for this knowledge to pervade both self and other through their 
interaction.  
 Hegel locates self-consciousness’s teleological development in three distinct moments: the 
first is the ‘pure undifferentiated I,’ or something like Kant’s transcendental unity of apperception 
in which the subject distinguishes itself from the object; the second is the self’s apprehension of 
itself through an independent object, or the realization of the primacy of human cognitive activity 
in the apprehension and categorization of organic life. This second moment also mirrors Kant’s 
account. But it is the third moment – self-consciousness – in which Hegel goes beyond Kant’s 
dualism:  
But the truth of this certainty [of the unity of self-consciousness] is really a double 
reflection… Consciousness has for its object one which, of its own self, posits its otherness 
or difference as a nothingness, and in so doing is independent. The differentiated, merely 
living, shape does indeed also supersede its independence in the process of Life, but it 
ceases with its distinctive difference to be what it is. The object of self-consciousness, 
however, is equally independent in this negativity of itself; and thus it is for itself a genus, a 
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universal fluid element in the peculiarity of its own separate being; it is a living self-
consciousness.138 
 
The fullness of self-consciousness that recognizes both difference from and unity with the object 
begins in this initial feeling of independence of self, formed out of separation from the object and its 
felt loss driven by the object in its independence. This relation of self and other, while initially 
presented by Hegel in abstract terms, takes concrete, and complete, shape in recognition of 
another self-consciousness. 
 We begin in an immediate relation of unity with the object in perception, only to be torn 
asunder from this unification by experience, through which we are returned to ourselves and the 
independence of both our selves and the other arises.139 Once this diremption has taken place, self 
cannot be put back together with its object in mere thought. Self-consciousness always intercedes in 
this relation – with desire driving us to grasp the object and in which we are thrown back on 
ourselves. This general structure of the relating of self with other is given its progressive nature 
through work, ultimately leading to a complex notion of mutual constitution through which we are 
able to relate not only to others, but also to nature. This identification of subject and object welds 
nature and ideation by positing the unity of mind and matter in Life. This unity is both a beginning 
and an achieved end: the unity of mind and matter must split itself apart and work through this 
separation in order to achieve self-conscious recognition of its unification, not in a simple identity, 
but in an integrated whole that both is and is aware of its unity.  
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139 “The Notion of the object is superseded in the actual object, or the first, immediate presentation of the object is 
superseded in experience… If we give the name of Notion to the movement of knowing, and the name of object to 
knowing as a passive unity, or as the ‘I,’ then we see that not only for us, but for knowing itself, the object corresponds 
to the Notion. Or alternatively, if we call Notion what the object is in itself, but call the object what it is qua object or 
for an other, then it is clear that being-in-itself and being-for-an-other are one and the same. For the in-itself is 
consciousness; but equally it is that for which an other (the in-itself) is; and it is for consciousness that the in-itself of the 
object, and the being of the object for an other, are one and the same; the ‘I’ is the content of the connection and the 
connecting itself. Opposed to an other, the ‘I’ is its own self, and at the same time it overarches this other which, for 
the ‘I,’ is equally only the ‘I’ itself” (Phen  104, ¶166).  
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Self-consciousness first appears as a one-sided, abstract notion. The abstract presentation of 
self-consciousness, “in showing that it is not attached to any specific existence, not to the 
individuality common to existence as such, [shows] that it is not attached to life.”140 The object itself 
is Life, but we must learn through experience, through the activity of undergoing with the object 
and returning to ourselves in work, to recognize this Life and our participation therein if we are to 
achieve self-consciousness. Yet, in this recognition, death also makes its first appearance: each 
individual, in its activity, seeks the death of the other and risks its own. This activity is two-fold. 
What Hegel refers to as ‘action of the other’ (i.e. other-directed motivation for action) seeks death. 
At the same time, this self-directed action (what Hegel refers to as ‘action on its own part’) 
involves staking its own life (i.e. to seek the death of the other in a reciprocal recognition is also to 
stake one’s own life). “It is only through staking one’s life that freedom is won”141 because the 
certainty of being-for-self is thus tested against its truth. This moment contains the seeds of mutual 
recognition in which only another, equal self-consciousness can serve as a test of self-certain truth – 
i.e. only a free and equal other who can also seek my death can affirm self-certain truths. Hence, 
Hegel writes, “Self-consciousness achieves its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness.”142 
Through the orectic encounter with another self-consciousness, self-consciousness becomes 
living – we take the other into account when giving an adequate account of ourselves. The moment 
at which one consciousness chooses survival, that is, mere life, thereby withdrawing from desire 
and becoming a bondsman, is the critical moment in introducing the mediation that will ultimately 
pave the way for a robust, historically grounded and social self-consciousness. Desire reappears at 
the junction where the bondsman achieves independence through work. “Work…is desire held in 
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check, fleetingness staved off; in other words, work forms and shapes the thing.”143 Through work, 
life takes on a distinctively human form, bringing subjectivity together with the object. Work 
simultaneously recognizes and supercedes the independence of the object by giving the object the 
shape of desire. This allows the worker to see his own independence reflected in the object. The 
introduction of work in the dialectic of Spirit brings together Life and self-consciousness in a way 
that injects history into their form. We here see Hegel begin to develop a robust account of the self 
in relation to others and as both a subject and agent of knowledge in its connection to nature. We 
are thus able to move beyond the fixed subject/object relation of the Kantian theater and usher in 
an anthropological and developmental account of their individual space in mutual constitution. 
 
2.4 Life and labor 
 
The inequality between lord and bondsman is quickly destabilized as nature reasserts itself into their 
relationship. If desire is self-consciousness, then the lord is stunted in his development: 
What desire failed to achieve, [the lord] succeeds in doing, viz. to have done with 
the thing altogether, and to achieve satisfaction in the enjoyment of it. Desire 
failed to do this because of the thing’s independence; but the lord, who has 
interposed the bondsman between it and himself, takes to himself only the 
dependent aspect of the thing and has the pure enjoyment of it. The aspect of its 
independence he leaves to the bondsman, who works on it.144  
 
The lord’s satisfaction is a mark of the limitation of his self-conscious activity, not of its coming to 
fruition. The lord only has a mediated relation to things insofar as they come to him through the 
bondsman. The bondsman also has a mediated relation to things, of course, but he does not 
completely annihilate them through consumption – he works on them.145 The bondsman, in his 
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145 “The bondsman, qua self-consciousness in general, also relates himself negatively to the thing, and takes away its 
independence; but at the same time the thing is independent vis-à-vis the bondsman, whose negating of it, therefore, 
cannot go the length of being altogether done with it to the point of annihilation; in other words, he only works on it” 
(Phen 116, ¶190).  
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subjugation, is thus revealed to be in a more self-aware position relative to the true nature of the 
relation to the object. While the lord can only consume and hence has a primarily negative relation 
to things, the bondsman, on the other hand, cultivates a determinate, positive relation to things 
through work. The independent object cannot be superseded,146 but it can be worked on and 
modified. Work thus represents, not an unmediated relation to objects, but a mediated knowing 
that incorporates (without superseding) the independence of the object. It is this recognition and 
interaction with objects that will ultimately give us the key to reconciling the antinomy of 
determination and freedom that plays out on the body of Life. 
For Kant, the relationship between nature and freedom is an external one. By contrast, 
Hegel unseats the distinction between laws of nature and laws of freedom, denying Kant’s implicit 
postulate that nature is not receptive to our freedom and actions. Life is what points beyond (or 
forms the bridge between) the antinomy of nature and freedom. Hance writes: “In asserting that 
the Concept underlies both nature and spirit Hegel rejects metaphysical dualism and indicates his 
intention to defend a version of metaphysical monism which refuses to recognize any absolute break 
between mind/spirit and nature.”147 The account of ‘Lord and Bondsman’ shows that this 
interrelation of freedom and nature is not merely abstract, but comes to fruition through history 
marked by work that brings subject together with object.  
Hegel’s subject is negating negativity or annihilating activity. This negating activity is 
precisely what situates the subject in the world insofar as this activity (which, as productive, has a 
product) appears. The subject comes to self-consciousness (and hence comes into subjectivity 
through reflexive recognition) through recognizing its products as the result of its own 
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activity/production. The subject thereby comes to see itself in its products and to develop a sense 
of self as the negative entity that produces and is mirrored in objects, i.e. it comes to establish itself 
as a subject over against worldly goods.  
The failure of desire to achieve its final satisfaction in consuming the object is not the 
failure of desire; in fact, it is necessary to the continuation of desire and hence a mark of both 
cognition and life. This reflexive turn of the bondsman back to nature inaugurates a deeper 
integration of nature and history in the development of Spirit. Work is what forms the bond 
between self and nature, as well as ushering in an intersubjective relation among selves. Ultimately, 
this seed of intersubjectivity is what drives a more robust account of ourselves in the world 
because, for Hegel, a recognition of one’s self only comes through recognition of one’s dependent 
relation to others. The individual self is initially abstracted from this mutual, constitutive 
recognition and must be returned to it with the added element of awareness. At each stage in the 
Phenomenology’s development, we move closer to an intersubjective relation with objects by 
working over the world. 
Through work, the connection with nature becomes a pre-condition of freedom. Hance 
writes:  
Living things are free (in pre-practical and pre-theoretical terms) insofar as they 
are not simply determined from without by external forces but have 
(preconsciously) organized themselves as self-sustaining wholes and in self-posited 
relations to an external environment. Spirit is practically free insofar as it has made 
a home for itself within the field of nature from which it has arisen and on the basis 
of which it realizes its purposes. Spirit is theoretically free insofar as it has 
comprehended itself not as an abstract subject set over and against hostile 
substance, but… as substance that is just as much subject.148  
 
The living thing’s self-determination in Life is the Ur-moment in the development of freedom, but 
this freedom is only given shape in actuality through work. Work mediates between our needs and 
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their satisfactions, first directly with the slave’s working over nature to feed the master, and later 
with the active engagement with our institutions and civil society. As the Phenomenology turns 
towards Reason in the development of Spirit, the discussion of work and freedom is infused with 
this Spirit, and the dialectical structure is recast as action and culture. The Phenomenology’s narrative 
development from Life to Spirit moves from a socially mediated relation with natural objects to a 
world of relations increasingly worked over by social mediation and in which objects are 
recognizable as social objects (e.g. institutions). Where Life is the immediate unity of subject and 
object, Spirit is “an achieved form of individual and collective mindedness, and institutionally 
embodied recognitive relations.”149 The process and reification of human activity in institution 
building is what Hegel means by ‘culture’.  
 Hegel speaks of culture as a ‘living whole,’150 that develops in “laborious emergence from 
the immediacy of substantial life.”151 Hegel speaks of emergence here as Anfang rather than Ursprung 
– a beginning rather than a metaphysical origin or ground. Life is a “rich and concrete abundance” 
that becomes subject through culture to classification and ultimately judgment.152 Hegel writes that 
culture, by leaving room for the “earnestness of life in its concrete richness…leads the way to an 
experience of the real issue” (though he never defines what the ‘real issue’ is).153 This is not 
dissimilar from Kant’s trajectory of life pointing to culture and beyond to the feeling of our moral 
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150 “As culture grows and spreads, and the development of those outward expressions of life into which dichotmy can 
entwine itself becomes more manifold… Such few attempts as there have been on behalf of the cultural whole against 
more recent culture, like the more significant beautiful embodiments of far away or long ago, have only been able to 
arouse that modicum of attention which remains possible when the more profound, serious connection of living art [to 
culture as a living whole] can no longer be understood” (DS 92). 
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sentiment. As Kant concludes in the Critique of Judgment on the ultimate purpose of nature as a 
teleological system, so too does Hegel indicate that life aims towards culture.154 
Through their ideas of culture, both Kant and Hegel are grappling with the meaning of a 
particular life in the context of historical development. By uniting nature with Spirit, Hegel welds 
together an account of particularity in the context of a whole with the larger narrative of the 
teleological development of Spirit. In the next chapter, I will delve into this relation between 
culture, teleology and self-consciousness as a lens through which to understand Hegel’s unique 
intertwining of reason and history.   
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ALIENATING LIFE AND FREEDOM 
 
 
At the end of Hegel’s discussion of self-consciousness, the Phenomenology takes a decidedly historical 
turn that will continue through the remainder of the text’s narrative until we arrive at Absolute 
Knowing. In this chapter, I will explore how and why, when history enters the scene, so too does 
freedom. In the previous chapter, I wrote that Life points beyond the gap between nature and 
freedom. Work is the fundamental moment that forms the bridge between Life and nature in self-
consciousness, as well as initiates the historical turn in ‘Unhappy Consciousness,’ where self-
consciousness becomes attached to the possibility of freedom. A robust potential for freedom is 
inseminated in Hegel’s Life and brought to fruition through ethical life and culture. The 
interconnection of history and Life that opens on to a space for thinking ‘forms of consciousness’ 
contains the kernel for actualizing freedom by recognizing the role of determination as freedom’s 
condition of possibility. By teasing out the themes of recognition and mutual constitution that flow 
through Hegel’s text, this chapter will trace the trajectory from recognition (as it appears in the 
chapter ‘Self-Consciousness’) to work as unleashing both freedom and history in the development 
of Spirit.  
 The themes of recognition, work, freedom and history converge in Hegel’s discussion of 
ethical life, a central moment in Hegel’s philosophy that takes into account both how our collective 
consciousness authorizes our normative precepts and how these norms and forms of consciousness 
change over time. In Hegel, the order of things contained in systematic philosophy is made social. 
Thus, where Kant reinforces the gap between rational and natural determinations, Hegel unworks 
this distinction through the very presentation and structure of the Phenomenology in which Life is 
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picked up and transformed through work into mediated relations of mutual constitution. Hegel’s 
account of ethical life is grounded in the social practices of a community and requires “the 
seriousness, the suffering, the patience, and the labour of the negative.”155 In our working over the 
object in its independence, both we and the object are altered and thus brought closer together as 
mediated, rational beings. As such, our ethical development in Spirit constitutes our rationality in 
the developmental trajectory of natural and historical life. Starting with the foundation of Kant’s 
treatment of normative recognition in biological life, Hegel goes on to expand Life to form a 
unified account of human practices in a Life that is simultaneously biological and rational.  
From the first reflexive moment in self-consciousness, an independent object is the catalyst 
for the reflexive turn and thus forms the basis out of which our consciousness takes shape. As 
Robert Pippin argues in Hegel on Self-Consciousness, the continuity between consciousness, self-
consciousness and ethical life indicates that human interaction – that is, out answerability to others 
– is analogous to our interaction and answerability to objects.156 Through the concept of Life, Hegel 
locates the connection between our relation to natural objects and other subjects as beginning in the 
same encounter with Life and developing into a robust ethical relation that shapes not only our 
relation to external reality, but also the character of our desire and (self) conscious selves.157  
Looked at through the lens of a world worked over – i.e. a world in which our activities 
alter the very objects that form the conditions of our consciousness – forms of consciousness are 
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157 Pippin (2011) writes of this development in terms of the transition from following our desires (conscious rather than 
self-conscious desire) to leading a life through action: “One discriminates between food and non-food, potential mate 
or not and so forth. But in this sort of a picture one is simply subject to one’s desire and subject to the fixed 
requirements of one’s species-life, subject to what Hegel starts referring to as life itself…It is another thing altogether 
to be considered the subject of a life, actually to lead a life… Having conceded that without sensory interchange with the 
world, there is no possible knowledge about the world, [Hegel] goes on to argue that such a perceptual interchange 
alone, or the mere matter of fact modification of our sensibility, cannot amount to a world we could experience” (66-
71). Rather, through congress with other similarly self-conscious beings, we begin to engage in actions based on 
reasons (i.e we being subjects of rather than to our desires) and giving meaning in social-historical context. 
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constitutive insofar as they shape institutions and our modes of interaction and articulation of 
objects, which in turn face the subject as external (social) realities. In ethical life, we are confronted 
with external determinations in relation to which we achieve autonomy by recognizing them as 
social structures we (or subjects like us) have created. As such, culture (Bildung) connects nature 
with history and, I will argue, is a key concept in understanding Hegel’s theory of freedom and the 
critical potential for giving a reflexive account of ourselves in history. 
Yet, lurking within the emancipatory potential of Hegel’s holism is the danger of its 
turning over into either a pre-critical idealism in which reality is a product of mind, or a quietistic 
justification for prevailing social conditions. This danger presents itself as Kant’s transcendental idea 
is transformed into Hegel’s absolute Idea, a move that threatens to turn Kantian conditions of 
possibility into an all-encompassing, constitutive totality. To defend an emancipatory reading of 
Hegel’s system as fostering conditions of freedom by expressing the conditions of our 
determination, one must justify the move to holist systematicity as a more robust account of 
(human) freedom and the validity of our judgments regarding freedom. This defense must also give 
an account of how Hegel’s teleological reading of historical-political life fosters dynamic systematic 
engagement with both our own freedom and freedom of others rather than sealing itself off within a 
determinative identity without difference.  
 
3.1 Recognition and the world worked over 
 
 Recognition first arises in Hegel’s text as a failed moment of empirical knowledge. The experience 
of epistemic certainty comes from superseding the other (i.e. grasping it in thought). However, 
when the knowing subject recognizes that this other is the precondition for this supersession, the 
subject’s primacy is overturned and it is once again uncertain of its knowledge. The subject is 
forced to recognize the other in coming up against the limits of her own knowledge (of the object) 
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and self-knowledge (of the condition of her own knowing).158 As we delve into self-consciousness 
as a springboard for understanding the development of ethical life, two themes – recognition and 
work – rise to the fore as primary concepts. Whereas biological life in Kant serves as a heuristic for 
understanding judgments of purposiveness and their validity within Kant’s system, Hegel’s 
presentation of Life gives rise to a logic of recognition rather than of validity. 
In other words: Hegel’s account of validity within a given social-historical arrangement is 
simultaneously a social account of how people behave in relation to these norms. Part of Hegel’s 
account of a custom’s validity is that social agents deem it valid and follow it as authoritative. In 
short: recognizing the validity of our laws becomes synonymous with their actualization. Yet, as 
Hegel’s treatment of the Antigone and its conflict between human and divine law reveals, this social 
recognition of a law’s authority is not sufficient to prevent a contradiction in laws. Therefore we 
require a more robust account of this recognition, and the possible resolution of contradictory 
norms and laws, in such a way that this recognition validates the rightness of our actions. 
The problem of the experience of certainty, which appears in the guise of the problem of 
the contradiction of social norms, is a recurring theme in the development of Hegel’s text. By 
intertwining historical development and work with a sense of certainty and its overcoming in 
developments spurred by contradiction, Hegel is delimiting an immanent justification for 
discursive, articulated, mediated knowledge as distinct from the experience of certainty. This 
distinction cannot be made within experience alone, but must be bolstered by a recognition 
achieved through the systematic interconnection of experience’s constitutive parts. Through his 
repeated invocation of certainty, Hegel is both playing on and working through the religious and 
philosophical history of transcendental justifications, i.e. the self-assurance of being right that is an 
expression of an incomplete understanding of the whole. Put differently, Hegel’s commitment to 
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the internal dialectical unfolding of knowledge cannot be sufficient to justify what we collectively 
take to be true or good but, as I will explore later in this chapter, it is a necessary condition for the 
development of our agency (and subsequently freedom) in terms that can be both recognized and 
actualized in our lifeworld.  
As we have seen through our reading of the Self-Consciousness chapter of the 
Phenomenology, communion with others forms the conditions of possibility for self-relation and 
knowledge. And yet, this relation to others is not a mere reaching out to or joining with others, but 
a reflexive and mediated relationship that allows us to know both ourselves and others. In the 
Preface to the Phenomenology, Hegel lambasts ‘common sense’ and ‘philosophizing by the light of 
nature.’ Common sense appeals only to individual feeling, and thus falls short of humanity, “for it is 
the nature of humanity to press onward to agreement with others; human nature only really exists 
in an achieved community of minds.”159 He continues: “True thoughts and scientific insight are only 
to be won through the labour of the Notion.”160 In other words, our presuppositions about the 
world must undergo reflection and mediation before they become insights. Common sense – as an 
immediate rather than achieved community of minds – fails to effect insight insofar as it lacks the 
labor of the negative (or self-alienation and reunification) gained through the encounter(s) with 
objects in their independence. This is no less true of our nature, which comes into existence in a 
rational world worked over – i.e. in an achieved ‘community of minds.’ This dialectical structure 
in which unmediated apprehension breaks into an antithesis and is reconciled in an achieved 
understanding is repeated throughout the Phenomenology. It undergirds the structure of recognition 
that is a necessary condition of self-consciousness.  
                                                
159 Phen 43, ¶69 
160 Phen 43, ¶70 
79 
Yet recognition is not a sufficient condition for self-conscious knowledge if it remains 
recognition in the abstract. Through the development of self-consciousness, we move from Life to 
living: living for self-conscious beings means both living with others (sociality) and living for 
something (a purpose or aim). As we see in the struggle to the death that opens the narrative of 
recognition in Self-Consciousness, the individual is, for Hegel, a result of, rather than a starting 
point for, social interaction. This is contrary to a contractarian account of struggle that begins from 
the atomistic individual and leads to the relinquishing of rights in order to join with others in 
society. In distinction, Hegel writes that subjectivity is a negative moment within this social 
congress and thus is not simply active, but rather interactive. The path of coming to self-
consciousness is ultimately shaped through interaction with objects – by the slave cultivating the 
land and realizing independence through this symbiotic relationship – as well as in the direct 
struggle for recognition between two self-conscious beings. This development indicates that nature 
is central to self-development as both of and in the world. Natural life is not merely preliminary to 
the interaction with other rational beings but fundamental to its possibility. 
The progressive history of the phenomenological development of Spirit towards its end in 
Absolute Knowing is a development of the intertwining of self with other. Consciousness moves 
through stages of engagement and reflection; with each progressive reaching out and return, 
consciousness returns to self-consciousness with added knowledge of both its interconnection with 
and alienation from the world around it. As the world of objects is made progressively more 
rational through our working it over, we see Hegel shift to language of a rational rather than natural 
world as the starting place of the self-conscious encounter. “Reason is Spirit when its certainty of 
being all reality has been raised to truth, and it is conscious of itself as its own world, and of the 
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world as itself.”161 This recognition of the entwinement of self and world is predicated on a world 
worked over through self-conscious activity. 
The conceptual developments of the Phenomenology are instigated by work, broadly 
conceived as modifying activity. The slave’s activity works over nature – the impenetrable given – 
without annihilating it, thereby transforming it into something that is now a product of subjective 
activity and thus knowable or accessible to knowledge.162 This movement begins in the slave’s 
working over nature, which spawns the recognition of his empowerment through producing the 
conditions for satisfaction of the master’s desire, and hence his superior position as one who 
produces but does not consume. Work initiates change in the object, but, for the slave who does 
not consume, also reveals the object’s permanence/substance through what remains unchanged in 
it. Just as the subject appears as the negative, annihilating moment in knowing the object, so too 
does the object reveal a moment of negativity or remainder as that which has not been subsumed in 
knowing or worked over in activity. Through work, the subject participates in the object, thus 
gaining a more robust sense of both her own and the object’s (or other’s) freedom. Hegel places 
emphasis on the participation of the object in observing reason – the movement of knowing is not 
perception’s one-sided approach of the subject towards the object, but also involves the movement 
of the object towards the subject. This working over that marks the move from nature to Spirit 
occurs, by contrast, at a visceral, lived level and not merely in thought. Only when borne out in 
history, developed through diremption and unification, do nature and Spirit (mind) have meaning 
and actuality.  
                                                
161 Phen 263, ¶438 
162 This is opposed to the activity of the master, which annihilates the object, consuming it as it is given and hence is 
without relation (which is the condition of knowability) to it. For this reading of the role of activity in the development 
of the relation between master and slave, see Kojève, chapters 1 and 2.  
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By revisiting our active experience of objects in light of the slave’s development of self-
consciousness as a product of his work, Hegel is demonstrating that experience, despite first 
appearances, is not a singular event of encountering an object, but is a layered event that grasps the 
object within a constellation of social and historical life. Hegel’s turn to self-consciousness thus sets 
the stage for his emerging claim that ethical life socially and historically situates our consciousness, 
thus completing the bridge Kant fails to fully make given his commitment to an ahistorical reason 
that grounds our practical/moral life. The turn to self-consciousness marks a shift from the 
question “How do we represent the world?” to “What must we be like, in our historically 
developing social practices, in order to make such a claim about the world as it appears to us?”163  
In his essay “Hegel’s Practical Philosophy,” Pippin writes that, as the development of social 
relations out of a natural state reaches a tipping point of complexity, nature (natural laws) ceases to 
be an appropriate explanatory tool and Spirit takes hold as a self-instituted norm.164 Spirit is thus in 
a continuum with nature in the developmental trajectory of freedom. As our world becomes 
increasingly worked over, “self-consciousness is Reason, its hitherto negative relation to otherness 
turns round into a positive relation.”165 Thus we see a shift from the individual as demanding 
freedom from the world, to a developmental story of cultivating individual freedom within the world 
and in relation to others. This simultaneously marks Hegel’s transition from recognitive relations to 
ethics and, as such marks a developmental transition away from an interrelation of independent 
objects to intersubjectivity. The rest of this chapter will explore the character of intersubjectivity in 
Hegel’s ethical life, ultimately aligning its deployment with Hegel’s notion of our freedom as 
constituted within our determinations.  
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3.2 Ethical life: the collective actualization of Spirit 
 
Ethical life intimately connects conceptual and social life. A form of consciousness cannot be 
separated from its customs and institutions as our institutions and our relationship to one another 
cannot be separated from our practical activities in these spheres. Our shared normativity is part of 
what shapes and constitutes the world as intelligible, orienting our interest and providing the 
conditions from which we make determinations and pursue actions. Where practical reason in the 
Kantian sense is a mere tester of laws, incapable of generating moral content, Spirit gives shape and 
meaning to this ethically informed world. As Hegel focuses his narrative on Spirit, we begin to see a 
shift from a language of recognition towards a speculative language of actuality. Hegel writes: “[the 
law] is and is validated; it is the universal ‘I’ of the category, the ‘I’ which is immediately a reality, 
and the world is only this reality.”166 This shift from validity to actuality is coeval with a shift from a 
deduction of truth that is accessed in experience to an historical development of truth through 
experiential interaction with others. Obedience to this law is not that of a slave to the arbitrary will 
of a master, but is recognizable as belonging to each subject’s own absolute consciousness.167 For 
Hegel, the source of normativity presented through these social activities and elements is 
intersubjective insofar as it is achieved through iterative interaction with others.  
A deeper reading of this engagement with others is not limited to interaction with natural 
objects and self-conscious beings, but also extends to that which comes to stand against us as objects 
in our lifeworld, viz. institutions. Institutions arise in civil society as a result of our collective 
activity, but soon become separated from their beginnings and assume an objectivity. Ethical life is 
characterized by both this entwinement of self and other in civil society, as well as our alienation 
                                                
166 Phen 260-261, ¶436 
167 “But since this existent law is valid unconditionally, the obedience of self-consciousness is not the serving of a master 
whose commands were arbitrary, and in which it would not recognize itself. On the contrary, laws are the thoughts of 
its own absolute consciousness, thoughts which are immediately its own” (Phen 261, ¶436). 
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from these objects (now norms and institutions) whose constitution we reenact through our 
recognition. 
Hegel’s concept of community begins to merge self and other in ethical life, moving them 
towards their full development in culture. In the perspective of ethical life, community is a concept 
that spurs the actualization and justification of norms. Whereas before Hegel spoke disparagingly of 
the ‘common sense’ or feeling, now he speaks of community: “In this determination, therefore, the 
ethical substance is actual substance, absolute Spirit realized in the plurality of existent 
consciousnesses; this spirit is the community which… has emerged on its own account in its truth as 
conscious ethical essence, and as essence for the consciousness which here is our object.”168 Spirit is 
preserved in its reflection in individuals, and also preserves these individuals within it. “As actual 
substance, it is a nation, as actual consciousness, it is the citizens of that nation.”169 Hegel writes that the 
community is the superior law whose validity is apparent;170 it is manifest in government. This 
unity of the collective in which individuals acknowledge their place in the whole without being 
subsumed within it is a continuation of the unification and diremption of self-consciousness. As 
such, Spirit is “the power of the whole, which brings these parts [of family and state] together again 
into a negative unity, giving them the feeling of their lack of independence, and keeping them 
aware that they have their life only in the whole.”171 Spirit represents the collective as conditioning 
our subjectivity through actions formed in community and solidified in institutions that come to 
stand against us as independent and are recognized as authoritative.172  
                                                
168 Phen 267, ¶447 
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170 “The community, the superior law whose validity is openly apparent, has its real vitality in the government as that in 
which it has an individual form. Government is the reality of Spirit that is reflected into itself, the simple self of the 
entire ethical substance” (Phen 272, ¶455). 
171 Phen 272, ¶455 
172 This reading is held by both Terry Pinkard and Robert Pippin in their various texts on Hegel, most notably argued in 
Pinkard’s Sociality of Reason.  
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Hegel’s treatment of ethical life and its sociality entails that there is no non-question-
begging justification for authority – authority is what is recognized to have authority.173 The 
question that remains live through the rest of Hegel’s account of Spirit is the extent of this 
determination of social authority. If authority is not, and cannot be, recognized as grounded in 
something that supersedes social relations (viz. religion), what is the nature of an individual’s 
interaction with these structures and the ability to critique or comprehend them? 
The collective activity of the sociality of consciousness enters onto Hegel’s historical scene 
in ethical life, both enabling and delimiting the realm in which conceptual and historical work can 
be performed. “Consciousness, which thus far finds in the object only universality, or the abstract ‘it 
is mine’, must take upon itself the movement proper to the object and, since it is not yet the 
understanding of the object, must at least be the remembrance of it, which expresses in a universal 
way what in actuality is present only as a single item.”174 The remembrance of universality in the 
object is analogous to a collective, historical knowledge that has not yet risen to personal 
understanding. The real critical insight comes, not merely in apprehending our common beginning 
and continued entwinement with nature (or the object), but in achieved awareness of the coeval 
development of both subject and object and that space in between in which the two entities cannot 
be distinguished. As Hegel writes, in pure insight, consciousness not only recognizes itself in its 
object of insight, but “is aware of itself as being also the mediating movement, aware of itself as 
being the activity of producing the object.”175 Mediating and discerning through our activity, 
judgment surface as a core practice for historical actors. In both the development of self-
consciousness and the later treatment of ethical life, Hegel’s inquiry remains about judgment and 
the validity of judgments situated in a historical world and limited by the perspective of an era’s 
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form of consciousness. As such, Hegel rejects Kant’s demarcation of the practical and theoretical as 
a fixed, ahistorical boundary in favor of a dynamic holism in which rational human life constantly 
renegotiates this boundary.  
 The structure of the development of Spirit is key in unlocking the emancipatory and critical 
potential of Hegel’s system. The movement repeated at each turn in Spirit’s development is that 
the immediate is broken open through its own internal unfolding and inherent contradictions in 
order to achieve its higher, more complete form. Dialectical critique reveals what seemed to be  
immediate content to be mere form and we are left, at whatever stage in the development of Spirit 
it finds itself, without the tools needed to discern contingent ethical content from content that 
should be preserved in order to create the conditions for human freedom in community. As Hegel 
writes earlier, ethical spirit divides itself into human and divine law, “but their antithesis is rather 
the authentication of one through the other, and where they come into direct contact with each 
other as real opposites, their middle term and common element is their immediate 
interpenetration.”176 It is the moment of interconnection – the chiasm or intersection of content 
and contradiction – that reveals their inner (and higher) truth, or gives the path to developing a 
more robust notion that accounts for what is true in both opposites.  
At the end of the development of the Ethical Order, Hegel repeats the dialectical division 
and reunion that spurs all major transitions in the Phenomenology.  Consciousness is again driven 
back into itself (zuruckgetrieben) to confront what is inessential in it, but now with a more actualized 
(i.e. developed or cultured) view of its own one-sidedness, achieved through the mediation of 
work and solidified in its legal standing. The actualization of the self, which was covered over in the 
universalizing tendencies of the ethical order, is now won by a return back to personhood. This 
return to self causes the rending of the self’s unity with the ethical order, hence “what in the former 
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was harmoniously one now emerges in a developed form, but as alienated from itself,” i.e. as 
culture.177 
 
3.3 Culture, or educated life 
 
Spirit, the actuality of ethical substance,178 develops from the Ethical Order to Culture, but remains 
alienated from itself in culture. As I will argue in the remainder of this chapter, this moment of self-
alienation is essential to freedom. In Culture, the individual simultaneously participates in (is 
determined by) and stands outside of (is alienated from) ethical life. The key to balancing 
determination with alienation is found in individual activities that instantiate the substance of Spirit 
in the collective:  
Spirit, being the substance and the universal, self-identical, and abiding essence, is 
the unmoved solid ground and starting-point for the action of all, and it is their 
purpose and goal, the in-itself of every self-consciousness expressed in thought. 
This substance is equally the universal work produced by the action of all and each 
as their unity and identity, for it is the being-for-self, the self, action. As substance, 
Spirit is unshaken righteous self-identity; but as being-for-self it is a fragmented 
being, self-sacrificing and benevolent, in which each accomplishes his own work, 
rends asunder the universal being, and takes from it his own share. This resolving 
of the essence into individuals is precisely the moment of the action and the self of 
all; it is the movement and soul of substance and the resultant universal being. Just 
because it is a being that is resolved in the self, it is not a dead essence, but is actual 
and alive.”179  
 
Without this participation in particularity, Hegel writes, ethical actions remain disunified from 
their substance and hence are either arbitrarily constructed or taken to be merely given from some 
transcendental source.180 It is only through our activity of repetition with difference and the 
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178 “Spiritual essence has already been designated as ethical substance; but Spirit is the actuality of that substance” (Phen 
263, ¶439). 
179 Phen 264, ¶439 
180 At the start of the section on Spirit, Hegel summarizes his preceding argument at ¶432-437 regarding ethical 
determinations as ‘matter in hand’: “This still abstract determination which constitutes the ‘matter in hand’ itself is at 
first only spiritual essence, and its consciousness [only] a formal knowing of it, which busies itself with all kinds of 
content of the essence. This consciousness, as a particular individual, is still in fact distinct from substance, and either 
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mediation of reflecting on our actions in light of their universal applicability that we begin to see 
Spirit unify with itself. As such, Spirit is the actuality of ethical substance181 or, put differently, it is 
both essential and aware of itself in the socially constituted world.  
This actuality comes to fruition in culture. Culture is the means by which what is implicit 
in Substance acquires an ‘acknowledged, real existence.’182 In the Preface, Hegel hints at this 
transition out of the immediacy of life and towards the historical development of freedom (in the 
context of Spirit): “Culture and its laborious emergence from the immediacy of substantial life [Der 
Anfang der Bildung und des Herausarbeitens aus der Unmittelbarkeit des substantiellen Lebens] must always 
begin by getting acquainted with general principles and points of view… From its very beginning, 
culture must leave room for the earnestness of life in its concrete richness; this leads the way to an 
experience of the real issue.”183 While Hegel never defines what the ‘real issue’ is, we can perhaps 
draw some conclusions based on his invocation of the ‘earnestness of life in its concrete richness.’ If 
we understand this appearance of Life in culture as a rearticulation of the object in its 
independence, we begin to see the continuation of the dialectical turns through diremption and 
unification as indicative both of the development and continuing enacting of self-consciousness.  
Throughout his treatment of culture, Hegel grapples with the determinate content of 
formal judgments of norms such as good and bad. These norms present themselves as immediate or 
given in a particular context, only to dissolve or turn into their opposite upon closer inspection. 
Neither sense-certainty nor mediated knowing is the truth of judgment, but rather a third term – a 
developed or cultured position – that can see both and is swayed by neither. Culture self-actualizes 
                                                                                                                                            
makes arbitrary laws or fancies that in simply knowing laws it possesses them in their own absolute nature. Or, looked 
at from the side of substance, this is spiritual essence that is in and for itself, but which is not yet consciousness of itself” 
(Phen 623, ¶438).  
181 Phen ¶439 Op. cit. fn. 178 
182 “Culture is the simple soul of the substance by means of which, what is implicit in the substance, acquires an 
acknowledged, real existence..” (Phen 299, ¶490).  
183 Phen 3, ¶4 
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in the uniting of these opposites and the recognition of this union: both being for self and its 
opposite are unified in the self, but “itself as an ‘other’; not as if this had a different content, for the 
content is the same self in the form of an absolute antithesis and a completely indifferent existence 
of its own. Here, then, we have the Spirit of this real world of culture, Spirit that is conscious of 
itself in its truth and in its Notion.”184 Hegel is describing the process of actualizing abstract norms 
that, in their actualization, are capable of being grasped in their fitness (or not) to our ever-shifting 
world. This process of normalization – of actualizing our universal norms in our concrete lifeworld 
– is simultaneously a process of describing our individual fitness to this lifeworld as subjects both 
created by and constituting this lifeworld through our actions. 
Culture represents a grappling with the place of an individual life in the context of 
historical development (or progress) that is governed by universal norms and given meaning in a 
situated lifeworld. Through his account of the Ethical Order and Culture, Hegel articulates a 
dynamic theory of community and the shared socio-political structures that are formed out of and 
inform this community. In history, this relationship to others becomes a relation to our institutions 
and norms. Through the concept of culture, Hegel begins to redefine the chiasmatic relationship 
between self and other as a kind of development: “The process in which the individuality moulds 
itself by culture is, therefore, at the same time the development of it as the universal, objective 
essence, i.e. the development of the actual world.”185 This gives context to Hegel’s statement that it 
is “through culture that the individual acquires standing and actuality.”186 This self-actualization 
requires the splitting off and reconciliation of the individual with ethical life.  
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Thus culture arises in the context of self-alienation. If ethical life is a totality,187 then 
culture is the rending of this totality into its internal divisions of selves and customs that are seen as 
external by these selves. As we have seen at each turn, this alienation opens up a space for 
reworking relations (between self and other, self and self, and now self and reified institutions and 
customs). For the second time in Hegel’s text, this transition sparks a Verkehrung188 – a turning back 
on itself with difference:189 “This truth consists in the fact that this universally acknowledged authority 
of self-consciousness is the reality from which it is alienated. This acknowledgement of its authority 
is the universal actuality of the self; but this actuality is directly the perversion (Verkehrung) of the 
self as well; it is the loss of its essence.”190 
The crux of the role of culture in the development of Spirit comes when Hegel unites 
culture with a process of inversion, driven by alienation, that continues to move the narrative of the 
Phenomenology forward: “It is this absolute and universal inversion (Verkehrung) and alienation of the 
actual world and of thought; it is pure culture.”191 All the moments of determination in opposition 
(self/other, good/bad, noble/ignoble) become inverted, changing into one another; the 
completeness of this turn Hegel calls ‘pure culture.’ Yet by ‘pure culture,’ Hegel can only mean a 
movement of division and reunification, enacted in the context of institutions that concretize norms 
within our social structure. 
In what follows, inversion starts to take priority as a central moment, not only of freedom, 
but also of justice – a new concept in Hegel’s developmental narrative. Hegel here traces the 
                                                
187 See Theunissen’s essay “The Repressed Intersubjectivity in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right” 
188 The contemporary German use of Verkehrung primarily refers to traffic. This correlation is interesting insofar as the 
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drive or direction of desire 
189 For a deeper reading of the use of Verkehrung in ‘The Inverted World,’ see “Hegel’s Inverted World” in Gadamer, 
Hans-Georg Hegel’s Dialectic: Five Hermeneutical Studies. 
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movement of a self that is not the truth of what it is for itself, but is something other than what it 
wants to be: “being-for-self is rather the loss of itself, and its self-alienation rather the preservation 
of itself.”192 The inverse thus becomes the primary moment of the self in self-alienation, a rendering 
strange of what is familiar. “What we have here, then, is that all the moments execute a universal 
justice on one another” through this inversion.193 One of the most striking elements of this truly 
fascinating passage is the dislocation of agency. It is not the self that creates justice (nor could it), 
but the totality of the moments that ‘execute a universal justice on one another.’ Spirit is the unity 
of all these disparate moments and achieves its “free actuality” – its concrete existence – as their 
middle (i.e. uniting) term.  
 The determinate relation between culture and freedom, as predicated on the self’s 
alienation from institutions and customs and the working over these customs to appropriate them in 
its freedom, forms not only the conditions for a determinate freedom within ethical life, but also 
the grounds of an emancipatory critique that both participates in and maintains critical distance 
from these norms.  
 
3.4 The development of agency: sociality as collective activity 
 
The achievement of self-consciousness as agency requires intersubjective recognition among self-
consciousnesses, a recognition predicated on work enacted in the wake of a frustrated relation to 
others (viz. the master), first enacted on the natural world and eventually in the world of 
institutional structures. Agency begins in self-consciousness and is developed in ethical life, marking 
a shift from work to action and forming the basis of freedom as self-determination. Where work 
describes our activity in relation to nature, action is situated within ethical life. Rather than as a 
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philosophy of work, Hegel’s corpus is better described as an ‘action-theoretical framework.’194 It is 
through action that we instantiate and test the normative structure of our lifeworld. Action brings 
us into self-conscious congress with the objective (or natural) world and sets the scene for the 
terms of this interrelation.  
In Hegel on Self-Consciousness, Robert Pippin writes that to be the subject of a life (to lead a 
life) requires that our desires be viewed holistically.195 I have argued that a broader notion of 
epistemic life that encompasses desire, recognition and our modifying activity better serves as a 
central concept for Hegel’s dynamic systematicity than desire alone. Hegel joins epistemic and 
practical norms through actions based on best knowledge. This means that we are authoritative in 
our understanding; this self-authoring is not merely the taking of one given object or another in a 
reactive and hence determined mode, but rather an interaction. To return to Pippin, if one were 
take a given object for our satisfaction “one would just express such orectic attitudes, whereas what 
we want is a subject of desire, a subject determining which desire is to be pursued and why, for 
reasons.”196 To become a fully authoritative ethical being, we must work over our desires through 
an interaction that remains, at its core, an exchange of self-conscious life, but in such a way that 
admits of inputs that can redirect and reshape its channels and objects. This development from 
being subject to our natural selves to being a subject of our self-conscious selves in informed activity 
comes in ethical life and arises along with the inauguration of agency as a robust concept that entails 
that one is able to undertake actions based on reason. Agency begins in Self-Consciousness and is 
developed in ethical life, marking a shift from work to action and forming the basis of freedom as 
self-determination.  
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If we, with Hegel, admit of our social determination as the condition of our individual 
agency, then we begin to see a modified notion of agency emerge through culture. As Pinkard 
describes: “For Hegel, agency itself is a kind of norm, something that is socially and historically 
instituted, not some metaphysical or natural fact. Our independence from nature, that is, is a 
normative historical and social achievement, not a fact (metaphysical and natural) about ourselves 
that we have only recently discovered.”197 As a primary condition of freedom, agency is an 
achievement within given socio-historical structures.  
Hegel’s invocation of community and the multiple instantiations of intersubjectivity that 
are undergirded by his interactive (and iterative) theory of freedom bespeak a mutuality in 
recognition: “Just as everything is useful to man, so man is useful too, and his vocation is to make 
himself a member of the group, of use for the common good and serviceable to all…But wherever 
he finds himself, there he is in his right place; he makes use of others and is himself made use of.”198 
There are two possible and, I would argue, not incompatible readings of this passage. The first is 
the quietistic reading, in which individuality is subsumed in the whole and can be deemed just only  
insofar as it is justified within the whole. The other reading is emancipatory insofar as it argues that 
we find ourselves in a particular situation that we cannot escape, but that forms the grounds for 
engagement. 
What we will continue to explore is the extent to which this delimitation of agency as 
something made possible only by a socio-historical context threatens to foreclose our agency or, by 
contrast, provides the conditions for a robust and situated (i.e. worldly, living) freedom. The 
question that haunts my attempt to defend Hegel’s system is whether this sociality of ethical life 
entails its arbitrariness when not interpreted through the teleological framework of progress 
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towards Absolute Knowing; if arbitrary, this would entail that the role for freedom within Hegel’s 
system is only guaranteed by the ahistorical condition of Absolute Knowing. It is clear that Hegel 
does not believe that ethical life is necessarily arbitrary because it is ungrounded, but he must rely 
heavily on contradiction in its negative function of revealing inconsistencies and hence instigating 
renewed thought and movement, as well as on teleology for determining the end towards which 
these socio-normative structures develop. 
Only in Absolute Knowing will the universality and particularity of our collective being 
come together in knowing, an achievement that is predicated on the end of history. History is not 
present or future, but only past. As such, for Hegel this conceptual and historical work can only be 
performed after the fact. Consequently, because we cannot simultaneously engage in historical-
critical work and be historical beings, the conditions of freedom for us are given rather than 
achieved.199 Turning to Absolute Knowing as the reconciliation of determination and freedom, we 
must question the extent to which Hegel’s theory of freedom can serve as a continuing tool for 
freedom’s realization. Put differently, culture is an intermediate aim in Spirit’s development that 
can be deployed through action to address limitations of historical (situated) knowledge and its 
determinations. As such, Hegel enacts a development from work as a central concept and force in 
this development to action, a situated concept that embeds both history and agency in work. Action 
achieves meaning only within a socio-historical context that recognizes its meaning. These actions 
both arise from and constitutively interact with (i.e. shape) our collective context. The remainder 
of this chapter will examine how this notion of action connects up to freedom by engaging in the 
realization of its conditions.  
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3.5 Freedom and determination in ethical life 
 
Freedom is an activity deeply tied to our practical engagement with the world. It is an experience 
not merely of how things are, but of how things should be. In this sense, we can analogize Hegel’s 
positive freedom to Kant’s reflective judgment where, in the encounter with biological life, we can 
experience both how things are and make judgments about how they should be. The telos of 
Hegel’s system reveals an ambivalence between what is foreclosed by the social and political 
context and what is unlocked through individual inquiry and attunement with (and work on) these 
conditions. Yet, the story that Hegel tells is not merely one of determination, but also of the 
development of determinacy. The movement of Hegel’s narrative unlocks an emancipatory 
potential in ethical life that is greater than his articulation of freedom insofar as it outlines a 
structure for critical engagement that is neither free from its conditions nor strictly determined by 
them. By returning to its beginning in Life rather than its end in Absolute Knowing and the State, 
we can understand Hegel’s theory of freedom as self-determination in its developmental fullness, 
driven by the independence of the object. 
 The possibility of defending a positive notion of freedom in determination in Hegel’s 
system entails that these conditions of freedom are born from our conditions of determination. 
Recognizing this constitutive relationship better equips us with the tools to determine and realize 
freedom in our lifeworld through social institutions and norms than would a negative notion of 
freedom that lacks a developmental account of agency. This defense must also give account of how 
Hegel’s teleological reading of historical-political life fosters dynamic and systematic engagement 
with our own freedom and its concrete social conditions rather than sealing itself off within a 
determinative identify without difference. 
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Freedom first appears in self-consciousness because the determinate freedom that Hegel 
has in view is fundamentally intertwined with agency. As part of her development towards 
freedom, a self-conscious natural being (the human organism) develops agency as the ability to 
interact with, rather than merely react to, her lifeworld. This story of agential development in a 
natural state progresses to civil society and community, where a socio-political context forms the 
conditions for the appearance of an individual and the conditions of her freedom. The first 
appearance of freedom is, however, negative: freedom is the withdrawal from Life. Elsewhere, 
Hegel calls this negative freedom a ‘freedom of the understanding.’200 He writes: “The freedom of 
self-consciousness is indifferent to natural existence… Freedom in thought has only pure thought as 
its truth, a truth lacking the fullness of life. Hence freedom in thought, too, is only the Notion of 
freedom, not the living reality of freedom itself.”201 The freedom of the Stoic and Skeptic is a 
freedom born of the isolation of the individual in which “the in-itself is the beyond of itself.”202 
Agency, understood as the capacity for action, begins in thought as a formal freedom, but 
in its beginning lacks the content that would allow freedom to shape and inform our worldly 
actions. For thinking to come alive with the content of the independence of things – for it to be 
agential - the particularity of its content must be present in thought from the beginning.203 Thus, 
positive freedom first appears where the subject returns to itself and lets the other go free.204 The 
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beginning moment of freedom lies in recognizing the independence of an other. In the development 
of freedom, it is not the return to self, but the independence of the object that haunts subjective 
freedom, thus denying the possibility of freedom merely negatively conceived. 
To better understand Hegel’s theory of positive freedom as developed in the 
Phenomenology, we can turn to its more compact treatment in the Philosophy of Right. Here Hegel 
speaks more directly of the will as free insofar as it is limited by a determinate content: “A will 
which… wills only the abstract universal, wills nothing and is therefore not a will at all. The 
particular [thing] which the will wills is a limitation, for the will, in order to be a will, must in some 
way limit itself.”205 As Hegel continues, this limitation of the will forms the grounds of meaningful 
freedom. “Freedom is to will something determinate, yet to be with oneself [bei sich] in this 
determinacy and to return once more to the universal.”206 Freedom is something that is cultivated 
in the person through determinate actions that provide the necessary content for this development 
in relation to others.207  
In The Pathologies of Freedom, Alex Honneth’s apologia for Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, he 
examines the definition and role of freedom of the will as presented in the Introduction to that text. 
Honneth, following Theunissen’s theory of communicative freedom, defines free will as ‘being 
with oneself in the other.’208 We are with ourselves in the other when both we and the other exist 
and interact in our independence, coming together as a process of opposition, recognition and 
reconciliation. As we progress through the development of Spirit, both we and the other increase in 
mediation and complexity, becoming institutionalized and encultured. According to Honneth, 
Hegel’s notion of freedom is predicated on a set of social or institutional conditions that are 
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external to the self and upon which the freedom of the will realizes itself through communicative 
relationships.209 Freedom is thus iterative, modifying through repetitions that take on different 
formulations through their interactions with a prevailing lifeworld. 
 “Ethical life is accordingly the concept of freedom which has become the existing world and the 
nature of self-consciousness.”210 Moreover, “the determination of ethics constitute the concept of 
freedom.”211 Yet it is only in culture that this freedom is given content. Culture represents the 
pivotal moment in the path towards self-realization in freedom insofar as it provides the self-
conscious conditions for recognizing culture’s involvement in the creation and sustaining of these 
institutions. At the beginning of Spirit’s alienation from itself in culture, Hegel writes: “Although 
this world has come into being through individuality, it is for self-consciousness immediately an 
alienated world which has the form of a fixed and solid reality over against it. But at the same time, 
certain that this world is its substance, it sets about making it its own.”212 Culture is the means by 
which the self works through the institutions that stand over and against it, containing both 
alienation from and participation in culture through action.  
Culture is the educational development of freedom in a concrete, historical context. This 
development of freedom in culture through iteration is not only reserved for social constructs, but 
also acts on our deeper desire and a cultivation of our ‘second nature.’213 Enacting an intertwining 
and working over of nature in culture gives context to Hegel’s infamous statement: “What is 
rational is actual; and what is actual is rational.”214 Through culture, we break open the given of the 
natural and subject it to rational engagement and thus to a possibility for actualization of our ideas.  
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Freedom unifies its conditions with its aims. For Hegel, this unification can only occur for 
an individual  if historical/political conditions allow for freedom. This limitation – or positivity – of 
the conditions of freedom is at once both a foreclosure and developmental positivity for 
emancipation of the individual. Honneth refers to this conjunction of determinations as the 
‘lifeworld’ in which freedom realizes itself: 
Thus the insight that the modern lifeworld contains a whole spectrum of 
interactional patterns guaranteeing freedom, which should jointly be called ‘ethical 
life,’ is connected in a precise sense with a therapeutic function: the moment 
readers accept the offer of an interpretation of their lifeworld as an instance of 
‘ethical life,’ they should liberate themselves from the deceptive attitudes that have 
so far prevented them from realizing their freedom.215 
 
 Honneth’s insight notwithstanding, the worry persists that Hegel’s is a quietistic reading of 
freedom as alignment with our determinations in which we can recognize but do not generate our 
conditions of life; i.e., in which we simply submit to the real. Ultimately, there is no resolution to 
the tension between emancipation and quietism in Hegel’s positive notion of freedom. More 
strongly, this tension itself is necessary to a defensible theory of positive freedom that holds 
together the interaction of determination and freedom such that we can both recognize and modify 
these determinations towards the end of creating the conditions of freedom in our lifeworld.  
The development of tools for exercising freedom involves a capacity for informed action 
rather than merely following a set of social rules conducive to freedom. Hegel’s account of the 
development of agency in the Phenomenology gives us insight into how this interconnection between 
an account of oneself and communal socio-normative conditions is not only a site of determination, 
but also of liberation insofar as recognizing this determination introduces mediation and hence 
critical distance into determinism. By tracing Hegel’s steps in the development of Spirit, we can 
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uncover the seeds of a robust theory of freedom that cannot be separated from these 
determinations. 
 100 
CONCLUSION: THE AFTER LIFE 
 
 “Human beings make their own history, but they do not make it just as they 
please” 
- Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire 
 
Through our exploration of the concept of Life, we have seen it develop dialectically from a static, 
ahistorical notion of biological life in Kant to a dynamic concept that serves as the nexus for 
subject/object interrelation in Hegel. In Life, we find the beginnings of an experientially driven 
epistemology that grounds the developmental narrative of self-consciousness. Through its 
encounters with otherness, the self comes to know both the other and itself – a dialectical 
development made possible by our common beginning in Life.  
 Life serves as a point of beginning and return for understanding the role that experience 
plays in the formation of our judgments. In Kant, our engagement with biological life forms the site 
for theorizing our normative judgments within experience, but these judgments are ultimately 
unable to give an account of life itself, returning instead to a theory of our apprehension of life in its 
first appearance. Hegel radicalizes this insight, rejecting Kant’s division between nature and reason 
and merging his practical and theoretical philosophy within ethical life. As such, Hegel is able to 
progress beyond life as a direct manifestation of nature and take an integrated view of our mental, 
social and ethical life as continuous with biological life. Hegel’s Phenomenology is the story of the 
unfolding of this Life that moves from an engagement with nature and our natural selves to the 
embodiment of our individual and collective selves in social institutions and norms. Hegel’s radical 
rethinking of the interconnection of natural and rational being necessitates a corresponding change 
in the concept of freedom.  
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 For Hegel, our agency is formed in a world that we did not create. Yet, in our activity of 
coming to self-consciousness through interaction with independent objects, we also shape this 
world and, in so doing, come to see our evolving selves reflected therein. We are in a dialectical, 
rather than a causal, relation to the objects around us and, as such, can be both bound and free, 
subject to and of this world.  
By rejecting the premise of the antimony of nature and freedom, Hegel opens up a space 
for rethinking our human freedom in concert with our natural and social determinations. As Spirit’s 
historical development progresses through the forms of life that cohere in institutions and 
governing paradigms of thought, Life develops from a naturalistic to a cultural concept. These 
developmental turns are driven by the independence of the object, destabilizing our determinations 
by introducing sociality into our iterative, dialectical developmental story.  
Hegel’s narrative is not about the subsumption of nature in Spirit, but rather its sublation 
in Spirit, in which it is integrated, preserved and transformed. As Marcuse writes in Reason and 
Revolution: “Subject and object are not undered by an impassable gulf, because the object is in itself 
a kind of subject and because all types of being culminate in the free ‘comprehensive’ subject who is 
able to realize reason. Nature thus becomes a medium for the development of freedom.”216 That 
nature is a medium for developing freedom is not only an historical claim, but one that remains 
present in the enactment of freedom in Life.  
Throughout this work, I have argued that understanding our rational selves as integrated 
with nature in Life is necessary to developing a robust theory of freedom as self-determination. 
Hegel’s theory of freedom recognizes our ontological dependence as social subjects of our historical 
context. He articulates this dependence that preserves and perpetuates the subject within Spirit 
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when he writes: “Spirit is the knowledge of oneself in the externalization of oneself.”217 While this 
statement seems to prioritize the subject, this image of Spirit’s reflection in externalization is one 
piece of the complex of interactions that forms our lifeworld and the reflective recognition of our 
place therein. Nature and mind come together in united form in Spirit. Perhaps it is more 
appropriate to state that nature, as well as mind, is sublated and reemerges as a new form of life. 
 
Freedom at the end of history 
 
And still, throughout the developmental narrative of the Phenomenology, there is a demarcated 
subject who develops as a free agent and engages with her lifeworld through actions. Only when 
historical conditions become fully aligned with the notion of freedom can we determine ourselves 
in this freedom.  
Freedom is the power not merely to determine ourselves, but in this determination to be 
aligned with the possibilities available to us in our lived world. As such, the notion of freedom itself 
is historical, developing to encompass a world consistent with a dominant social determination of 
freedom, but also, in Hegel’s narrative, progressively modifying itself to incorporate its 
contradictions. As Hegel understands it, the possibilities of my freedom are conditioned by the 
necessities of my reality. We can only realize our freedom fully when our lifeworld is consistent 
with our self-determinations such that I can actualize my freedom in the context of a free lifeworld 
that supports the development of our human agency in its freedom. Without the external 
conditions of freedom, individual acts of freedom are partial and thus lack meaning in our broader 
community (e.g. as in Stoicism). By tracing the manifestations of freedom as incomplete acts that 
are dissonant in a lifeworld that has not yet achieved its final form, Hegel leaves open room for acts 
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of freedom that are not fully determined by their current historical conditions, while admitting of 
the social limitations of our personal freedom as predicated on the freedom of our social context. 
And yet, the achieved ideal of our self-actualization in Absolute Knowing is also our 
dissolution into this whole. In other words, the actualization of freedom ceases to be recognizable 
as freedom. At Hegel’s end in Absolute Knowing, the differences generated in time and through 
encounters with otherness are sublated as Spirit becomes fully integrated with itself. I have argued 
that Hegel’s system delineates the conditions of an action-based theory of freedom that is born from 
a beginning in Life; this freedom develops from the dialectic of self and other that allows for an 
engagement with otherness and its ultimate reunification in mediated immediacy of its experience. 
What remains, therefore, essentially unclear at the end of history in Absolute Knowing is the 
continuing story of individual development within this end. Hegel’s metanarrative of the 
developmental conditions for individual agency as historical conditions holds an implicit place for 
individual development within a lifeworld. It seems as though Absolute Knowing does not fit 
within this conceptual framework of a lifeworld insofar as it is not in history, but is actualized 
universal Reason and hence is complete and unchangeable. The reading of Life proposed in this 
dissertation plays against these quietist and totalitarian tendencies of Absolute Knowing and Hegel’s 
systematic project. To reframe Hegel’s insistence on dialectic, it is the interplay, rather than the 









In The Future of Hegel, Catherine Malabou defines the foundation of Hegel’s dialectical process as 
“the movement of self-determination.”218Malabou connects Hegel’s dialectic to notions of plasticity 
and temporality teased out from Hegel’s texts. For her, three elements combine to generate a sense 
of the future as critical insight: “The dialectical composition of such concepts as ‘the future’, 
‘plasticity’, and ‘temporality’ forms the anticipatory structure operating within subjectivity itself as 
Hegel conceived it. To distinguish this structure from the future as it is ordinarily understood, we 
will name this structure ‘to see (what is) coming’ (le ‘voir venir’), obeying Hegel’s injunction to 
philosophize in one’s own idiom.”219 She describes her notion of voir venir in terms of the interplay 
at work in Hegel’s philosophy between teleology and surprise.220 Malabou applies the very terms of 
Hegel’s dialectic to argue that, if we understand and take seriously Hegel’s claims about the process 
of Aufhebung and its historicity, then we must admit of an evolving reading of Absolute Knowing.221 
Hegel’s system retains its relevance for us because it requires an undergoing – we experience the 
Phenomenology and its concepts as in flux in their development.  
When I speak of the continued relevance of Hegel’s theory of freedom for contemporary 
social thought, I speak not of a static notion of achieved freedom, but rather of emancipatory 
activity, or the activity of working on our lifeworld in a way that recognizes that we are determined 
by this world, but are also the makers of it. In a different context, Malabou writes of the 
“cooperative play of habit and alienation.”222 This interplay of habit and alienation – of the internal 
drives of habits formed through the internalization of external structures and the external forces 
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that we experience as alienating – points to the complexity in Hegel’s dialectic. The potential for 
social critique and the cultivation of positive freedom within these deterministic social structures 
does not come from outside this dialectical relating, but is generated in its very complexity. This 
dual recognition of determinism and freedom connected to activity forms the backbone of activist 
thought that both recognized its conditions and seeks to change them. The alternative is idealistic, 
in the political sense of a fanciful and ineffective thought that does not recognize its worldly, 
limiting conditions. 
Bringing together naturalism and idealism in epistemic life connects us to our own self-
understanding in a way that recognizes the continuity between our desires and our reasoning, while 
also comprehending the productive strife in these aspects of our mental life. Hegel historicizes this 
coming-to-self-knowledge through forms of consciousness in a way that accounts for not only the 
personal, but also the social in this self-realization. If we accept the claim that our rational self is of 
a piece with both our social and natural selves, then any concept of personal freedom must 
acknowledge its dependence on a self that is contingent upon and developed out of these external 
conditions.  
The continued relevance of Hegel’s system for informing a positive theory of freedom, that 
acknowledges both the role of our determinations and activity in its realization, must give us the 
tools not only for comprehending the role of institutions and customs in developing our agency but 
also for theorizing dialectical conditions for resistance to and transformation of those norms and 
institutions that undermine our agency. The ability to identify contradictions and seek their 
resolution requires a systematic tool for critical engagement. As such, there is an important 
heuristic function in Absolute Knowing that is consistent with the developmental story of the 
Phenomenology as the progressive working over of nature into human institutions that increasingly 
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reflect our achieved and yet-to-be-achieved freedom. Ultimately, within Hegel’s own system, it is 
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